In my Monday column (“Opposition candidate can win”),
written just before the announcement of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu as the
opposition's joint candidate, I argued that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
can be challenged and possibly defeated in the election for president of the
republic only if the two main opposition parties, the Republican People's Party
(CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), present a common candidate who
will be able to garner the votes of some supporters of the Justice and
Development Party (AKP). The largest majority of the
opposition now has such a candidate.
Mr. İhsanoğlu is not only a good candidate for Çankaya as respects his personal attributes, but also his candidacy makes it possible to change the political game in Turkey. The former head of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Professor İhsanoğlu is known as a prominent expert on Ottoman history in academic circles. His attitude toward the Turkish republican tradition and secularism clearly shows that he cannot be considered a politician who belongs to political Islam. When speaking to the Cumhuriyet daily on Tuesday, İhsanoğlu said he was upset by criticism claiming that he is against secularism and bears hostile feelings toward Atatürk. “I feel very sad when I hear such assessments. Rejecting Atatürk and the reality of the republic and its gains would be a huge mistake,” he said.
İhsanoğlu must be seen as subscribing to the Ottoman tradition of the Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası (Freedom and Accord Party), whose political line was, by the beginning of the 20th century, based on a constitutional democracy and on the conciliation of Islamic values with individual liberties. This party constituted the backbone of the opposition against the İttihad ve Terakki Fırkası (Party of Union and Progress), which represented Turkish nationalism and positivism with Jacobin practices in the political fight. This main political fault line has been around during the republican era; the CHP represents the Union and Progress tradition, while various center-right parties represent the opposite tradition, starting with the Terakki Perver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republican Party), which was banned and closed down by the CHP government in 1925.
So, one should not be surprised by the fact that İhsanoğlu's candidacy provoked furious debates within the CHP. The Kemalist wing of the party, representing the Union and Progress tradition today, strongly opposes the choice of İhsanoğlu, and claims that it has been betrayed by the chairman of the CHP. At the same time, this risky choice for CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu should be considered a major move aimed not only at seriously challenging Mr. Erdoğan and his presidential ambitions but, at the same time, opening the way for a reconciliation between the two historical political traditions that may enlarge the entrenched electorate of the CHP through possibly attracting the support of conservatives. Nevertheless, this opening may also provoke the departure of Kemalists from the party. The result of the election will be a crucial turning point since it could drastically change the course of Turkish politics. If Mr. Erdoğan wins, Turkey will experience a de facto presidential regime, which is likely to deepen the existing political fractures and finally destabilize Turkey. If Mr. İhsanoğlu wins, not only will an actual authoritarian drift be stopped but, at the same time, the chance to make a new democratic Constitution based on a compromise will be increased.
Can Mr. İhsanoğlu win the election? Yes, but this depends on the answers to three critical questions. No doubt, İhsanoğlu will gather the support of a very large majority of the MHP electorate, and those of the two small Islamic-rightist parties, the Grand Unity Party (BBP) and the Felicity Party (SP). This support will guarantee him a vote share of above 20 percent. The critical question is what will be the voting behavior of the CHP electorate, which constitutes about 25 percent of the total electorate. If an important part of them – say, for example, 30-40 percent -- decide to boycott the ballot box and if İhsanoğlu is not able to bite into the AKP's electorate, Mr. Erdoğan may win right at the first round. So, this is the second critical question. However, I believe İhsanoğlu is probably the best candidate able to get the support of some non-core AKP electors.
I think if the share of CHP voters refusing to make a choice between Erdoğan and İhsanoğlu remains rather limited, and if İhsanoğlu succeeds in winning over even a modest part of the AKP electorate, the winner will be decided in the second round. Here, we come to the third critical question. What will the attitude of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party/Peoples' Democratic Party (BDP/HDP) -- presenting its own candidate in the first round -- be in the second round? It is up to İhsanoğlu to convince this party that he will not be an obstacle to a democratic solution of the Kurdish problem.
Mr. İhsanoğlu is not only a good candidate for Çankaya as respects his personal attributes, but also his candidacy makes it possible to change the political game in Turkey. The former head of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Professor İhsanoğlu is known as a prominent expert on Ottoman history in academic circles. His attitude toward the Turkish republican tradition and secularism clearly shows that he cannot be considered a politician who belongs to political Islam. When speaking to the Cumhuriyet daily on Tuesday, İhsanoğlu said he was upset by criticism claiming that he is against secularism and bears hostile feelings toward Atatürk. “I feel very sad when I hear such assessments. Rejecting Atatürk and the reality of the republic and its gains would be a huge mistake,” he said.
İhsanoğlu must be seen as subscribing to the Ottoman tradition of the Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası (Freedom and Accord Party), whose political line was, by the beginning of the 20th century, based on a constitutional democracy and on the conciliation of Islamic values with individual liberties. This party constituted the backbone of the opposition against the İttihad ve Terakki Fırkası (Party of Union and Progress), which represented Turkish nationalism and positivism with Jacobin practices in the political fight. This main political fault line has been around during the republican era; the CHP represents the Union and Progress tradition, while various center-right parties represent the opposite tradition, starting with the Terakki Perver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republican Party), which was banned and closed down by the CHP government in 1925.
So, one should not be surprised by the fact that İhsanoğlu's candidacy provoked furious debates within the CHP. The Kemalist wing of the party, representing the Union and Progress tradition today, strongly opposes the choice of İhsanoğlu, and claims that it has been betrayed by the chairman of the CHP. At the same time, this risky choice for CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu should be considered a major move aimed not only at seriously challenging Mr. Erdoğan and his presidential ambitions but, at the same time, opening the way for a reconciliation between the two historical political traditions that may enlarge the entrenched electorate of the CHP through possibly attracting the support of conservatives. Nevertheless, this opening may also provoke the departure of Kemalists from the party. The result of the election will be a crucial turning point since it could drastically change the course of Turkish politics. If Mr. Erdoğan wins, Turkey will experience a de facto presidential regime, which is likely to deepen the existing political fractures and finally destabilize Turkey. If Mr. İhsanoğlu wins, not only will an actual authoritarian drift be stopped but, at the same time, the chance to make a new democratic Constitution based on a compromise will be increased.
Can Mr. İhsanoğlu win the election? Yes, but this depends on the answers to three critical questions. No doubt, İhsanoğlu will gather the support of a very large majority of the MHP electorate, and those of the two small Islamic-rightist parties, the Grand Unity Party (BBP) and the Felicity Party (SP). This support will guarantee him a vote share of above 20 percent. The critical question is what will be the voting behavior of the CHP electorate, which constitutes about 25 percent of the total electorate. If an important part of them – say, for example, 30-40 percent -- decide to boycott the ballot box and if İhsanoğlu is not able to bite into the AKP's electorate, Mr. Erdoğan may win right at the first round. So, this is the second critical question. However, I believe İhsanoğlu is probably the best candidate able to get the support of some non-core AKP electors.
I think if the share of CHP voters refusing to make a choice between Erdoğan and İhsanoğlu remains rather limited, and if İhsanoğlu succeeds in winning over even a modest part of the AKP electorate, the winner will be decided in the second round. Here, we come to the third critical question. What will the attitude of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party/Peoples' Democratic Party (BDP/HDP) -- presenting its own candidate in the first round -- be in the second round? It is up to İhsanoğlu to convince this party that he will not be an obstacle to a democratic solution of the Kurdish problem.
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