European crisis etiketine sahip kayıtlar gösteriliyor. Tüm kayıtları göster
European crisis etiketine sahip kayıtlar gösteriliyor. Tüm kayıtları göster

9 Ocak 2013 Çarşamba

How bad is it going in Europe?

The European Union entered 2013 full of uncertainty despite some achievements realized in 2012. In a recent interview with German daily Handelsblatt (Jan. 2), Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize economist, stated that “the real risk for the World economy is in Europe."


The American economist points to the ongoing economic difficulties for Spain and Greece, which are still in recession, and the absence of signs that would allow them to exit from it. Stiglitz believes that the purchase program of Treasury bonds implemented by the European Central Bank can only be a temporary solution since the ECB requires austerity conditions for its financing. According to Stiglitz this conditionality will only have the effect of aggravating the state of the sick.
I agree with Stiglitz's diagnosis. The eurozone could not solve its structural problems. Even I can assert that European managers don't have an agreed-upon strategy. The basic problem is the absence of a growth perspective. The divergence between North and South regarding economic fundamentals persist and the only cure proposed for the moment is the pursuit of austerity and painful reforms. Let's first look at the table below summarizing the state of the divergence in the eurozone.

2013 forecasts of the main economic indicators for some eurozone countries (%)

Germany
Italy
Spain
Greece
Interest rate
1,3
4.5
5.3
11.9
Debt to GDP*
80.4 (81.8)
129.6 (127)
100.2 (93.8)
193.2 (181.3)
Growth rate*
0.6 (0.9)
-1 (- 2.2)
- 1.4 (-1.3)
- 4.5 (- 6.3)
Unemployment*
5.5 (5.3)
11.4 (10.6)
26.9 (25)
26.7 (23.6)
Source: OECD, Bloomberg
* The figures in the brackets are the late estimations for 2012
Since ECB President Mario Draghi declared that “the euro is irreversible” and since he started the purchase of sovereign bonds without limit, a certain calm occurred in financial markets. Italy and Spain can continue to borrow at the lowest rates, but their current rates (4.5 and 5.3 percent) are still quite high, putting strong pressure on their budgets. The public debts of these two big countries, “too big to fail,” will be continuing to increase in 2013 (see table) because they will still be in recession and because they will be still unable to bring out sufficient primary surplus in their budgets. The least adverse event could provoke speculative panic on their sovereign debt, squeezing the ECB into the corner.
Unfortunately, these kinds of events are quite likely. General elections will be held in Italy on Feb. 24. “Cavaliere” has come back. In case of Mr. Silvio Berlusconi's victory -- this cannot be disregarded -- it will be very bad news for Europe given his anti-euro and anti-Germany discourse. The risk of a reversal in the reforms implemented by Mario Monti is serious. In Spain there are no elections, but Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy is having great difficulty in meeting the budget deficit targets. Spain must roll on 21 billion euros of public debt in the coming weeks, and this can get investors nervous if they doubt the solidity of Spanish public finances. Admittedly, Spain cannot afford an increase in its interest rates, and in such a case the recourse to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will be unavoidable.
Greece continues to be the moribund member of the eurozone. It was rescued in extremis but it now faces very hard homework, containing tax increases, wage decreases, public employee firings and huge privatizations. The Greek economy will find it hard to reach sustainable growth for a long time even after the country repays its sovereign debt -- which will reach three times its national income. A very large write-off is unavoidable and everybody, particularly Chancellor Angela Merkel, is aware of this necessity. But since such a “haircut” will concern mainly the pocket of the Northern Europe taxpayers, Mrs. Merkel will wait until the German general elections scheduled for September before accepting the write-off. In the meantime she will be hoping that the Greeks will be able to cope with the deepening austerity and still increasing unemployment (see table).
This is not sure at all. Alexis Papachelas, a columnist for the Ekathimerini newspaper, recently expressed very well the political risk regarding the chances of the austerity plan. He finalized his article of Dec. 29, 2012 with this conclusion: “The fact is that we need to rebuild the country from its foundations. The present coalition government cannot do this because on the one hand it is being pulled down by hands within its own parties and on the other it is faced with an opposition whose only demand is that everything stops.”
As it was the case last year, this year we will also be obliged to follow the European saga, holding our breath.

16 Temmuz 2012 Pazartesi

Austerity policies in jeopardy


Last week different events from the five eurozone countries painfully tackling their debt crisis showed the increasing difficulties in implementing the austerity programs set by the Troika -- the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).


Finnish Finance Minister Jutta Urpalainen and
PASOK leader Venizilos
Let's scrutinize them, starting with Greece, the most indebted, as well as the most rebellious to the Troika's austerity plans.
The Troika offered Greece a bailout loan worth 360 billion euros, an amount bigger than its gross domestic product (GDP), until 2014 as part of a very severe belt-tightening program that includes wage cuts, firings from the public sector, cuts in welfare spending and market reforms aiming to open protected professions, such as taxis drivers and pharmacists, to competition. The objectives were aimed at achieving a balanced budget and a competitive economy in 2014. Though George Papandreou's PASOK government had barely started to apply the austerity program, Greeks strongly resisted it, provoking two general elections within a year. Unsurprisingly, delays occurred in the implementation of the austerity program, and it is now clear that the budget deficit target of 5.4 percent for this year will not be reached.
Indeed, the problem is not with the delays, though each year of delay requires an additional injection of 50 billion euros, but the inability of Greece to implement the austerity program. The Troika is ready to allow for an extension of the program despite its cost, but not a compromise. IMF spokesman Gerry Rice, during a press conference last week, excluded any renegotiations but said that the fund was open to discussion “if there are ideas how to better achieve those objectives.” On Wednesday, officials from the government of Prime Minister Antonis Samaras will meet with Troika representatives with the hope of reversing some unpopular measures while the Troika will ask Greece how they plan to save 11.5 billon euros by 2014. I expect a political crisis -- another one -- since the Democratic Left (DIMAR) who barely supported Samaras' government and with the promise of loosening austerity measures, will probably break with it.
Portugal has been considered, until recently, the model student of austerity programs, but this might be a bygone era. The center-right government of Pedro Passos Coelho had already cut wages and spending on over-indebted hospitals and had aimed to achieve a budget deficit of 4.7 percent, which was close to 10 percent in 2010. But like in other similar cases, the Portuguese economy will contract more than expected, and the austerity measures already in place will not be sufficient. But what is really new in Portugal is the increasingly popular resistance to the austerity measures. Doctors went on a two-day strike last week. Moreover, the constitutional court canceled the public sector wage cuts, arguing that they conflict with the principle of equal treatment. The government responded by saying it would proceed to cut wages in the private sector as well.
Another model student, along with Portugal, was Ireland. Following the collapse of its banking system because of mortgage madness, the Irish state had an abyssal budget deficit of 30 percent. The Troika provided Ireland with 85 billon euros, approximately half of its GDP, in bailout funds as part of a drastic austerity program with the same belt-tightening measures as Greece. The austerity measures were so drastic that the deficit decreased by 10 percent, though the public debt to GDP ratio was still increasing; it is expected to reach 120 percent in 2013. But the bad news is that the growth prospects of the Irish economy are bleak because of the European recession as it is heavily dependant on exports. Currently, the Irish are getting ready to ask for the same privileges that are accorded to Spain, who is facing similar difficulties -- a banking system that is about to collapse under the burden of unpaid mortgages. Recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was obliged to accept that European funds had to be used directly to support Spanish banks in order to avoid further increases in the sovereign debt, so the Irish demands are perfectly legitimate.
The case of Spain is well known as it has been on the front pages over the past few weeks. The center-right government of Mariano Rajoy came to power promising sweat and pain, but his homemade austerity program faces an increasing resistance, and it is uncertain if they will be successful given a more severe recession than was expected. The short-term debt of Spanish banks with the ECB has already reached 340 billon euros, and experts say more will be needed. The Spanish sovereign debt interest rates are around 7 percent, showing the weak confidence of financial markets. Obviously, the situation cannot last.
The case of Italy differs on two important fronts. It is colossal, and it has the second biggest public debt after Greece, but it has a low budget deficit (less than 3 percent). Despite this, it faces, like others, very bad growth prospects. The IMF forecasts a 1.6 percent contraction of its GDP this year. Prime Minister Mario Monti succeeded in enforcing some structural reforms, but these need time to help growth and it is also unclear if they will be sufficient, as noted by Moody's. The rating agency downgraded Italy by two notches last week, from A3 to Baa2, arguing that Greek and Spanish risks had increased and were contagious.
Let me finish this parade of facts and events with a very symptomatic one regarding future possible developments in the eurozone: Finnish Finance Minister Jutta Urpilainen declared that “Finland would consider leaving the eurozone rather than paying the debts of other countries in the currency bloc.” And Monti responded to her by saying that such “irresponsible sentiments push up Italian interest rates.”

25 Haziran 2012 Pazartesi

The European deadlock



SEYFETTİN GÜRSEL

s.gursel@todayszaman.com

This week will probably be one of the most critical in Europe's history. On Thursday a European summit will decide how to handle sovereign debt, as well as the banking crisis and also the Greek economic crisis. We are used to seeing European summits ending in compromise. This time it could be different.


The positions of the protagonists on fundamental issues such as common debt, direct aid to shaky banks and the Greek crisis are so opposed, and the ground for compromise so narrow, that rather than compromise the summit may simply result in a deadlock.
Let's start with the most urgent issue, the Greek crisis. Early elections on June 17 finally produced a government, but quite a strange one. The winner of the elections, Antonis Samaras, leader of the New Democracy party, succeeded in forming a coalition government with the support of two leftist parties, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the Democratic Left (DIMAR), but these parties have declined to contribute ministers to the government, content to support them with a vote of confidence. Obviously the moderate left, facing aggressive opposition from the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), does not want to take the full weight of government on its shoulders in case the attempt to renegotiate the current belt-tightening measures, which constitutes the backbone of the new government's policies, fails.
This failure is more than probable. Samaras has made it clear that the stabilization program of the troika -- the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) -- is not working, and that its results are so painful (you can have a quick look at my previous article, “Sisyphus and the Danaids”) that it should be renegotiated. Samaras has asked to postpone austerity measures, worth 12 billion euros for the period 2014 to 2016, and prolong unemployment indemnities for up to two years, further extending them to the self-employed. Furthermore, he intends to implement a series of tax breaks, such as decreasing VAT in restaurants from 23 to 9 percent to give a push to the tourism industry and lowering the tax on profits to 15 percent, aiming to encourage investment. To balance this, he says that he is ready to accelerate privatizations.
To put it simply, Samaras wants to increase public expenditure and decrease tax revenue, hoping that these measures will produce some growth. Indeed, a 4.7 percent contraction had been forecast for this year, but now experts are talking about a contraction of more than 6 percent, given the ongoing crisis. Even if the measures proposed by Samaras work, it is obvious that this will take time, and meanwhile Greece will have a much higher budget deficit than the 7.3 percent predicted for this year. I do not think that the promise to accelerate privatizations can convince even the supporters of renegotiation in Europe, given the fact that privatizations have yielded only 1 billion euros until now.
One can be sure that even a minimal compromise on renegotiation will require billions of euros in fresh European money. According to an expert from Brussels (published in Le Monde, June 21), each year of delay in the program will cost between 20 and 25 billion euros. But the problem is, whatever the amount, the extra funds risk falling into the leaky barrel of the danaids. Furthermore, Greece risks becoming a “bad example” for other countries suffering under the same kind of austerity measures. During the last week many German figures have said “Nein” to the renegotiation, and it is noticeable that they have been strongly supported by the president of the Eurogroup, Jean-Claude Juncker, who has declared that “substantial modifications in the program are not possible.”
The Greek crisis is not uniquely the headache of Europe. Spain has a government very committed to applying its own belt-tightening measures. The problem is that its banking system is on the brink of failure. The estimated cost of a bailout hovers around a minimum figure of 60 billion euros. As for Italy, its technocrat government does not seem strong enough to implement structural reforms and austerity measures. Remember that the sovereign debt of Spain and Italy together is 10 times greater than Greece's. If nothing is done, Spain and Italy will soon be unable to roll on their debt in the financial market. In past months Southern Europe, plus France, has asked for the issuing of bonds backed by EU members, and for the direct injection of capital into banks from European funds. Last Thursday this concept had a new supporter in the person of Christine Lagarde, IMF director, who called for an urgent decision on both issues as time is running out. She also urged the ECB to adopt a more relaxed monetary policy.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel does not want to hear anything about this “irresponsible thinking.” A meeting held last Friday in Rome between the leaders of Germany, France, Italy and Spain failed to produce any compromise on the debated issues. Merkel said the direct bailout of banks “violates treaties” and reiterated her opposition to Eurobonds, as well as to the purchase of bonds by the ECB. Germany is afraid of an uncontrolled drift that may result in a situation in which it is finally forced to endorse a big part of the southern debt. But on the other hand, it does not know the possible cost of a European meltdown for Germany. This uncertainty frightens it as well.