income inequality etiketine sahip kayıtlar gösteriliyor. Tüm kayıtları göster
income inequality etiketine sahip kayıtlar gösteriliyor. Tüm kayıtları göster

20 Ağustos 2014 Çarşamba

The price of inequality

This is the title of Joseph E. Stiglitz's book, recently published in Turkish by local publisher İletişim Yayınları. I met Professor Stiglitz, a well-known American Nobel prize-winning economist, in İstanbul, where he had been invited to a United Nations Development Programme conference. I asked him some of the questions that I had in mind after reading the book.

Prof.essor Joseph E. Stigiltz
The book, published in 2012, discusses the dangers of rising inequality in the US. Stiglitz asserts that American capitalism has for a long time been operating for the benefit of the top “1 percent.” There are multiple reasons: high unemployment causing pressure on wages, wrong Federal Reserve (Fed) policies that are too oriented toward Wall Street interests rather than those of the people, unjustified and shameless bonuses for CEOs, an unfair tax system that favors the wealthy, etc.

According to Stiglitz, equality of opportunity has disappeared, if ever it existed. According to recent research, 90 percent of the income growth realized in the aftermath of the Great Recession has been taken by the top 1 percent. Real wages are decreasing for the majority of workers while the future becomes less secure for them. In Stiglitz's opinion the US has become a class society, in the sense that the educational system and inheritance of wealth lead to existing inequalities being perpetuated. When Stiglitz was writing his book (in 2011) the US unemployment rate was quite high, over 8 percent. Nowadays it is close to 6 percent. What does Stiglitz think about this impressive improvement?

Well, he does not seem to be that impressed. He argues that “recorded unemployment” is one thing, “real unemployment” another. The decline in unemployment would have been the result of two facts: first, a decrease in the labor force, due mainly to the discouragement effect as many individuals ceased looking for jobs. Secondly, part-time jobs were an important factor in the jobs created in the last few years. To justify this, Professor Stiglitz highlights the fact that real wages continue to stagnate. Stiglitz does not believe that the full unemployment is achieved.
He thinks that the Fed's interest rate policy aimed to protect financial interests in the past, since its managers have been chosen from among either Wall Street people or those close to them. These managers focused too much on the hypothetical danger of inflation rather than on economic growth. Professor Stiglitz agrees that the Fed should be independent in its policies and asks for radical changes in the election of its managers as well as for real transparency, in order to make the central bank politically accountable for its decisions. Stiglitz said that the Fed's former chair, Ben Bernanke, has been overly obsessed with inflation, but this is not the case with Janet Yellen, the current chair, who seems more concerned with unemployment rather than the threat of inflation.


However, according to his own words, Stiglitz considers himself rather “optimistic,” unlike Thomas Piketty's “pessimism” that emerges in his bestselling book “Capital in the 21st Century,” where Piketty defends the premise that rising wealth inequality is inherent to capitalism since the era of higher per capita income growth reinforcing the working middle class is now over. Stiglitz admits that American society became a class society, but at the same time he believes that it may be cured, basically through two stages of policy: Fresh resources can be raised by canceling the special provisions on capital tax and making income tax more progressive, and then these resources must be spent in education, research and development and social aid. This will boost the economic productivity and consumption of the 99 percent and will put the US economy on the path to growth in which inequality will start to decrease.
(this article is published in Todays' Zaman, August 19, 2014)

10 Haziran 2014 Salı

The rise of the middle class

Growth of the middle class in developing countries is considered by political scientists to be the backbone of democracy and economists consider this growth an important factor that drives economic development, since the enlargement of the middle class allows for both an increase and diversification in consumption.

Recent research by Joao Pedro Azevedo from the World Bank that has not yet been published but was presented last week by the author at the Bahçeşehir Center for Economic and Social Research (BETAM) offers new insight regarding issues of poverty and the middle class in Turkey.

Azevedo's paper ("Pathways to the Middle Class: How have reducing poverty and boosting shared prosperity helped?" a joint work with Aziz Atamanov) studies the evolution of income growth and income distribution from 2002 to 2011 based on government Household Budget Surveys (HBS) statistics. In line with Word Bank standards, the authors define three groups across income distribution: The poor have an income of less than $5 per day, those with an income between $5-10 per day are considered vulnerable, and, finally, the middle class earns more than $10 per day. Incomes in Turkish lira were converted to US dollars using the World Bank's scale of purchasing power parity (PPP) for 2008. The study contends that not only the evoluton the groups’ shares but also transitions in both directions.

The proportion of the poor in the total population in Turkey was 43 percent in 2002. This figure declined to 22 percent in 2011, while the proportion of the middle class rose from 20 percent to 40 percent. The vulnerable segment remained at around 37-38 percent. This is certainly a remarkable achievement in terms of poverty reduction and middle class growth, but it is not as bright a picture as our rulers try to convince us it is. Indeed, a comparison with Central and Eastern European countries shows that Turkey performed better than some countries like Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, Armenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary, but worse than countries like Romania, Bulgaria and Poland in the period 2006-2011.

As for the transition dynamics, they provide interesting insight regarding movements from one group to another. The data indicate that 41 percent of the poor moved out of poverty during the period and became members of the vulnerable category. None were able to jump straight to the middle class. Middle class category growth was the result of transfers from the vulnerable group to the middle class; 40 percent of the vulnerable category entered the middle class. Only 1 percent of the vulnerable group fell into poverty and no middle class individuals experienced the high income losses that would have pushed them down to poverty. It is also worth noting that only 2 percent of middle class individuals fell into the vulnerable group. These findings indicate that the decrease in poverty as well as the growth of the middle class was the result of a smooth process of increasing per capita incomes from the bottom to the top. Turkey did not experience strong volatility during the period of sustained high economic growth -- close to 6 percent on average -- during the period 2002-2011.

The striking feature of Turkey's poverty reduction achievement is that it was mostly due to an increase in per capita income rather than a redistribution of income. According to the paper's authors, 89 percent of poverty reduction in Turkey came from economic growth; in Latin American countries, the contribution of growth to poverty reduction has been limited to 47 percent, with the remaining 53 percent being the result of income redistribution. This comparison demystifies the "successful" redistributive policies claimed by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Another interesting finding of the study appears when poverty reduction is analyzed according to various types of income. There are three major contributors to poverty reduction: an increase in real wages -- particularly the minimum wage increase in 2004, the increase in employment and pensions. The contribution of social assistance lags well behind these three majors contributors.

What can be drawn from the findings of this recent study in respect to the political economy? At first glance, I might assert that during its first decade of rule the AKP was able to enlarge its electoral base -- which reached 50 percent in the general elections of June 2011 -- mostly due to pro-poor and pro-middle class economic growth. However, given the fact that this growth was based on domestic demand fueled by foreign loans which led to a very high and unsustainable current account deficit, the limits of pro-poor growth might have been reached. Relevant income data for the last two years is not available yet, but we already know that the growth rate declined abruptly to 3 percent because of strict control of private consumption. We can predict that it will likely be quite difficult to reduce poverty and to continue the growth of the middle class in the context of a low growth regime without strong redistributive policies.
(Published in Todays' Zaman, June 10, 2014)

29 Ekim 2013 Salı

Income inequality: a highly controversial subject

The most popular economic topic of recent months was low growth. Nowadays the focus seems to have shifted towards another hot topic: income inequality.
Last week Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan declared that economic growth must alleviate poverty. Umut Onaran, a deputy chairman of the Republican People's Party (CHP), published a very critical evaluation of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government's economic performance, claiming that the standard of living in Turkey has not improved, while income inequality has worsened. As the elections approach, I think we will be talking more about inequality and poverty.
Representation of the income distribution
by Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient 
What do the figures say about this controversy? Since 2006, the Turkish Statistics Institute (TurkStat) has published some measures of inequality based on Income and Living Conditions surveys, whose samples are sufficiently large to give a picture at the regional level. The 2012 figures were published recently. Thus, the period in question does not cover the entire AK Party era (2003-2012), but it allows us to observe the evolution of income inequality in the recent period.
Before considering the TurkStat figures, let us recall that the relationship between economic growth and income inequality is not straightforward. Since the work of Simon Kuznets, it is largely believed that income inequality increases in the first years of economic development, while it begins to decline in the years of maturation. This inverted “U” form of the so-called “Kuznet's curve” is largely explained by the transition from an agricultural economy, where income inequality is relatively low, to an industrial economy characterized by low wages in the first years while wages increase along with labor productivity during the years of maturation.
However, income inequality measures show that in a large number of developed countries income inequality continued to increase from the 1990s due to an increase in wage inequality between wage laborers, the reason being the widening wage gap between qualified and unqualified labor. Thus, it is not certain that economic growth will alleviate poverty automatically.
Having said that, let's look at the TurkStat figures. TurkStat publishes two measures of inequality, the Gini coefficient and the S80/S20 ratio, plus one measure of poverty, the Relative Poverty (RP) headcount ratio. The Gini coefficient, varying from 0 to 1, is a measure taking into consideration the differences in income from each individual to others. The value of 0 means perfect equality while 1 means that one individual has the entire income. The S80/S20 measures the relationship of the 20 percent holding the greatest distribution of income to the 20 percent holding the least. It can be considered a more sensitive inequality measure than Gini in terms of changes in poverty. The RP ratio measures the percentage of individuals in the total population with an income amounting to less than 60 percent of the median income. As such, it is a measure of income inequality rather than a direct measure of poverty.
What do the data say? The Gini coefficient was at 0.428 in 2006 -- note that this was the highest in Europe -- and then decreased to 0.405 in 2008, increased to 0.415 with the economic crisis of 2009, decreased again with the strong recovery to 0.402 in 2010 and has now been stagnant for two years. The same pattern is observed in the S80/S20 and RP ratios. From 9.5 in 2006, the S80/S20 ratio decreased to 8.1 in 2008 before increasing to 8.5 in 2009. Finally it decreased to 8.0 in 2010 and maintained this level for the following two years. More or less, the RP ratio followed this pattern: From 25 percent, it declined to 22.6 in 2011 and kept this level in 2012, the economic crisis having a very limited effect on RP.
Without a doubt, income inequality has decreased, albeit modestly, in the last six years. However, most of the improvement occurred before the crisis, a period during which growth was based largely on gains in labor productivity (see my column “Turkey on the brink of middle income trap,” Sept. 2, 2013). I have also to note that in two regions, İstanbul and the Mediterranean area, income inequality increased in recent years while it was decreasing in others, the three best performers being Western Anatolia, Central Anatolia and the Eastern Black Sea.
Although the average growth rate reached 5 percent in the last two years, the improvement in income inequality halted overall while varying a lot between different regions. Will these conflicting patterns have an impact on the AK Party's votes, particularly in İstanbul, next March? We know that voting patterns do not depend only on well-being, but we shall see.