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Consumer prices published yesterday indicate a rise in the momentum of
inflation. Annualized inflation increased from 7.75 in January to 7.9 percent
in February; this may be considered quite moderate, but we have observed
dangerous increases in the core inflation indicators (H and I indices).
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Indeed, in February, the H inflation index increased from 7.7 to 8.6
percent and the I increased from 7.6 to 8.4 percent on a yearl basis. These
results are clear signs of increasing inflation in the coming months.
In its last quarterly report on inflation, the Central Bank of Turkey was
already obliged to increase its year-end inflation forecast from 6.2 percent
to 6.8 percent. A second revision is now unavoidable. We will know the new
forecast in April, when the second inflation report will be published. But we
can almost be sure that the new forecast will be over 7 percent. Inflation is
not getting closer to its target of 5 percent; on the contrary, it is moving
away from it. One can say that this is not a new thing since this has been
the case for years. The central bank will, once again, have to write a letter
to the government, as the law requires, explaining that the culprit for
increased inflation is the depreciation of the Turkish lira.
I am not sure that the rise in inflation is that simple and won't affect
our lives.
Repeated failures concerning inflation put the credibility of the central
bank at stake. Furthermore, open political pressure on the central bank's
management, exerted by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself and by
some other ministers criticizing interest rate increases, have established an
unhealthy environment. The central bank cannot escape from its main duty:
price stability. In Turkey, this means lowering the inflation rate close to
the targeted 5 percent and keeping it there until a new target is set.
Notes from the Monetary Policy Committee (PPK) extraordinary meeting of
Jan. 28 indicate that this reality was clearly brought up: “In order to
contain the deterioration in inflation expectations and pricing behavior, the
committee implemented strong and frontloaded monetary tightening. … A tight
monetary policy stance will be maintained until there is significant
improvement in the inflation outlook.”
Well said! However, there is a problem. Paradoxically, this tightening
occurs in the context of low economic growth. Usually, monetary tightening is
implemented when demand exceeds potential growth, in other words, when the
economy grows too much that it leads to an increase in prices.
Now, in our case, inflation is actually rising because of rising import
prices due to the recent depreciation of the Turkish lira and, to some
extent, because of the rise in food prices. One can claim that the
depreciation is pushing inflation up, but this is a transitory effect and if
the exchange rate is stabilized and the tight monetary policy is maintained,
the rise in inflation would be reversed within a few months.
That is true. The exchange rate seems to be stabilized, at least for this
moment, but at a rather high level. This is good news for export-led growth.
We may expect a positive contribution of net exports (exports growing more
rapidly than imports). Nevertheless, it is not sure that the positive
contribution of net exports would be sufficient to compensate an eventual
decline in domestic demand. All leading indicators in this respect are in the
red. The central bank's management is aware of this eventuality. One can read
in the committee's meeting notes: “There is a gradual slowdown in loan growth
stemming from the tight monetary policy stance, the recent macro-prudential
measures and weak capital flows. The data regarding the first quarter of 2014
indicate some deceleration in final domestic demand.”
I believe pursuing tight monetary policy in the context of low economic
growth would not be an easy task at all for the central bank. The Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government will test its popularity very soon -- in
local elections on March 30. If the results from the ballot boxes are not
satisfying for AKP rulers, they will be all the more worried for the
presidential and general elections to follow, since the low economic growth
will become more apparent and its adverse consequences on the social front
will be felt even more. Given the approach of Erdoğan and his inner circle to
the monetary policy, we can easily predict that they will not accept being
simple spectators who simply wonder what the central bank is going to do.
Frankly speaking, I am worried about the central bank in terms of the
political pressures it will be facing in the near future.
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growth etiketine sahip kayıtlar gösteriliyor. Tüm kayıtları göster
growth etiketine sahip kayıtlar gösteriliyor. Tüm kayıtları göster
4 Mart 2014 Salı
Central bank facing new challenges
22 Şubat 2014 Cumartesi
Where I agree and disagree with Babacan
7 Şubat 2014 Cuma
USD per capita income stagnating
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Readers should be aware of the 2023 economic target set by the Justice
and Development Party (AKP) government, but let me bring it up again: Turkish
gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to reach $2 trillion, with a per
capita income of $25,000 when the centenary of the Turkish Republic is
celebrated. The per capita income will have more than doubled in 10 years,
making Turkey a developed country and, at the same time, a global power.
Needless to say, this more than ambitious economic target constitutes a key
propaganda item for the AKP, aiming to stay in power for another 10 years, if
not more. However, this target is definitely in jeopardy. Let me explain.
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A per capita income of $25,000 was already out of reach when it was
announced two years ago but it was possible to hope for a figure close to
$20,000 at least. Indeed, assuming that real GDP income growth would be as
high as in the 2002-2011 period -- around 6 percent -- and also assuming that
the lira would continue its upward trend in the next decade, a per capita
income of $20,000 would have been a realistic target. The graph below asserts
that from 2002 to 2011, per capita income rose from $4,000 to $10,000, by 150
percent. Roughly half of this increase came from real GDP growth, increasing
by almost 60 percent -- the graph shows the index for real GDP increasing
from 100 in 2002 to almost 160 in 2011 -- while the other half came from the
strong appreciation of the lira in real terms.
However, this high growth-strong lira period is definitely over because
of one simple reason: The pursuit of domestic demand-led growth fueled by
foreign borrowing is impossible from now on. Many factors lie behind this
impossibility: The domestic demand-led growth regime coupled with low
domestic savings drove the current account deficit (CAD) to unsustainable
levels; an international liquidity glut easing foreign borrowing is ending;
and, last but not least, total factor productivity growth, a key factor of
the competitive strength of the economy, has dramatically decreased over the
last few years (See my article “Turkey on the brink of middle of income
trap,” Sept. 2, 2013). Under these circumstances you cannot have either high
real GDP growth or a continuously appreciating lira.
Thus, the stagnation of per capita income at $10,600 over the last two
years must not be considered a surprise (See graph). Indeed, the average
growth rate has barely reached 3 percent -- 2.2 percent in 2012 and it is
expected to stand around 4 percent in 2013 -- while the lira has been
depreciated sizably. This low growth-weak lira episode should not be
considered as transitory. This year, one expects not only a growth rate of
below 3 percent at best, but at the same time, the depreciation of the lira
of over 10 percent which occurred in January will hardly be reversed. Thus
you should not be surprised if we witness a decrease of per capita income in
dollar terms in 2014.
You can ask, “What about the remaining years?” Well, this depends on real
GDP growth as well as on productivity performance. All productivity and
balanced growth enhancing economic reforms have been postponed to after the
general elections, which will be held at the latest in May 2015. It is
difficult to predict what the electoral outcomes will be and their effect on
political developments for the incumbent party. But even if the AKP
government is strong enough to enhance the structural reforms required, the
Turkish economy can have at best 5 percent real GDP growth (its estimated
potential) along with a limited appreciation of the lira.
This means that a per capita income close to $18,000 by 2023 would
already be a challenging target. I recommend that AKP managers focus on
solutions to existing structural economic problems rather than searching for
scapegoats.
US dollar per capita income and real GDP growth (2002-2013)
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24 Eylül 2013 Salı
TÜSİAD on domestic savings
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Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) President
Muharrem Yılmaz said on Friday that the quality of economic growth will carry
significant importance in the coming years, echoing recent comments by Deputy
Prime Minister Ali Babacan.
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Yılmaz added that Turkey's growth model needs to be reconsidered and that
Turkey needs to take bold, determined steps in three areas: boosting domestic
savings, successfully completing the settlement process with the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK) and making structural reforms. The settlement process is
widely commented on every day by the columnists of Today's Zaman. Let me
focus on domestic savings, which has multiple links with structural reforms.
The ratio of domestic savings to gross domestic product (GDP) has
declined dramatically since 2000, from more than 20 percent in the 1990s to
12 percent in 2012. Low domestic savings is certainly the most important obstacle
but not the only one to balanced, satisfactory economic growth. A sizable
increase in domestic savings is a necessary condition for the growth regime
to change, but it will not be sufficient alone. The Turkish economy must at
the same time be able to export the surplus of goods that will not be
consumed in the domestic market due to the increase in savings. If not, the
economy will go into recession due to insufficient aggregate demand. We know
this because of the “paradox of thrift” popularized by John Maynard Keynes.
This paradox would be mitigated by Turkish industry strengthening its
competitiveness, which would require radical reforms in education,
innovation, etc., as stated by Babacan and reiterated by Yılmaz.
The TÜSİAD president said that at least three percentage points must be
added to the current domestic savings rate. This effort would not be enough,
but it would certainly be welcome. Yılmaz noted policies in a five-year plan
that aim to increase domestic savings: fighting the informal economy,
strengthening the social security model, enhancing insurance systems and
facilitating access to financial tools. I must say that even if these goals
are achieved, they will hardly increase the domestic savings rate by three
percentage points.
Indeed, the first two policies aim to increase public savings. Public
savings constitutes approximately 3 percent of GDP. Even if different aspects
of the informal economy are addressed, such as the non-registration and
under-registration of wage earners in the social security system, public
income would only rise 0.3 percentage points at best, according to my
estimations. If serious income tax reform to widen the tax base is
implemented to complement the fight against the informal economy, then public
savings would certainly increase further. Nevertheless, even a one percentage
point increase in GDP -- which would mean more than a 30 percent increase of
public savings -- would be a great success. That said, do not forget that
increasing the average tax rate would also adversely influence the savings of
households and companies through the crowding out effect.
The remaining two percentage points should come from the savings of
households and companies. Here we have a basic problem. In the case of
household savings, I should remark that it would be very difficult to change
the current consumption patterns of Turkish households. They have started to
consume more, thus save less thanks to the credit glut and much lower
interest rates than in the 1990s. Households are also much less worried about
unexpected health expenses thanks to improved and extended social coverage.
The two policies in the five-year plan aiming to boost private savings only
“enhance insurance systems and facilitate access to financial tools.” These policies
may well be helpful, but only marginally. The best tool in this area would be
radical severance pay reform, but this reform project continues to rot in the
drawer.
So, what about the savings of companies? Nobody talks about this burning
issue. Turkish corporations can save more if profits increase and are then
invested instead of distributed to shareholders. The most straightforward way
to increase profits would be to decrease wages, but this can hardly be done.
The cost of labor may be lowered, but this would require difficult labor
market reforms. Another option is the depreciation of the lira as this would
boost export profits, but this has its limits because of high inflation.
Indeed, the most effective option would be to increase productivity. This is
possible if comprehensive productivity-enhancing reforms in education,
technology and innovation are realized, as was underlined by the TÜSİAD
president. We are impatiently awaiting them.
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2 Eylül 2013 Pazartesi
Turkey on the brink of middle income trap
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Turkey has had an astonishing performance with regards to income per
capita in the last decade. Indeed, the per capita income has risen from
$3,000 to $11,000 under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AK
Party). Encouraged by this performance, the AK Party set very ambitious goals
for the next decade, feeling confident that it would be possible to repeat
this great performance in the future. Indeed, the AK Party is aiming for per
capita income of $25,000 by 2023. I tried to explain several times before in
this column that there is little chance of doing so. This time I would like
to share with readers further evidence to back my claim.
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The Bahçeşehir University Center for Economic and Social Research (BETAM)
last week published a research paper titled "Türkiye orta gelir
tuzağının eşiğinde" (Turkey on the brink of the middle income trap). As
one of the authors of this research, let me explain briefly how the idea for
this subject came about. At BETAM we have for years now been closely
scrutinizing the Turkish labor market, publishing a monthly “Labor Market
Outlook” and a number of occasional research briefs on various labor issues.
It was surprising to observe continued high job creation despite the huge
decline in the growth rate in the last two years. The factors behind this
“happy” event are still not clear. Based on the findings of some preliminary
research we suspected that the incentives intending to lower labor costs
(such as subsidies for social security premiums) would have contributed to
this nice surprise regarding unemployment.
But considering the quality of growth as well as the per capita income
performance, it was not difficult to predict the existence of some problems,
particularly regarding the evolution of labor productivity. Thus, we decided
to look more closely at this aspect using a simple decomposition methodology
that allows us to break down the per capita income increase into its three
contributors: the ratio of the working age population to the total
population; the employment ratio (employment /working age population); and
labor productivity, defined as the gross domestic product (GDP) per employed
individual.
The contribution of the working age population ratio is marginal. Though
the working age population is still growing more rapidly than the total
population, this factor will be extending into the 2020s because of an aging
population. As for the two other factors, namely the employment ratio and
labor productivity, three different periods are observed. Before the Great
Recession in 2009, from 2005 to 2008 high growth was driven almost by labor
productivity increases, with the index of labor productivity rising from 100
to 109.6. During this period, total employment almost stagnated, though
non-farming employment rose remarkably. Indeed, agricultural employment
declined strongly, thus contributing -- via the composition effect -- to the
increase of overall labor productivity while labor productivity was also
increasing in non-agricultural sectors.
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the nature of growth changed
dramatically. From 2009 to 2011, though the Turkish economy had high growth
rates, both the increase in the employment ratio and the increase of labor
productivity contributed more or less equally to the increase of per capita
income. However, since 2012, not only did the growth rate decrease
dramatically but the increase in labor productivity first stopped and later
started to decrease, as BETAM's research shows. Indeed, the index of labor
productivity decreased from 105.8 to 104.8 from the second quarter of 2011 to
the first quarter of 2013. Thus, for two years now, under the combined effect
of low growth and declining labor productivity, the increase of income per
capita is almost stagnating.
Obviously, if this poor growth performance continues to prevail, the per
capita income of $25,000 targeted for 2023 will never be reached. Moreover,
the Turkish economy risks being trapped in the middle-income group of
countries since increases in the per capita income will be very slow, if not
stagnating. High job creation is certainly good for keeping unemployment in
check. Nevertheless, labor productivity must start to increase again in order
to continue to increase social welfare. The Turkish economy needs growth
rates higher than the current one hovering around 3.5 percent actually.
Moreover, this additional growth should come from labor productivity gains.
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25 Haziran 2013 Salı
The ‘sudden stop' threat
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While I asked in this column on Saturday
if the “Turkish economy is on the eve of a recession,” Professor Daron
Acemoğlu from MIT was speaking the same day at
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A hot debate is open.
Let's first briefly explain the “sudden stop” for readers unfamiliar with the
concept. In an economy where capital movements are free, short-term
investments and capital inflows can change direction and leave the recipient
country very quickly from time to time. The reversal of capital flows depends
basically on an eventual risk of capital losses due to a decrease in asset
prices. When this eventuality is perceived by the majority of investors, they
simply take home their money.
A number of factors
can cause such behavior, and there is no need to invent an “interest lobby” to
explain the sudden stop phenomenon. For a foreign investor who exchanged some
amount of dollars into Turkish lira and invested it in Turkish-lira
denominated assets, the value of the Turkish lira becomes a decisive
parameter. If the majority of investors start expecting an imminent
depreciation of the local currency, it is quite rational for them to sell
their assets before this depreciation occurs. And when sales begin, asset
prices start decreasing.
Economists call this a
“self-fulfilling prophecy.” Of course the risks and consequences of the
sudden stop vary from one economy to another. The lower local interest rates
are compared with the expected interest rates of safe assets like American
Treasury bonds or Eurobonds, the higher the risk of a sudden stop. The larger
the current account deficit in an economy and the more over-financed it is by
short-term capital flows, the more likely this economy is to face a sudden
stop. And last but not least, the weaker investors' confidence in economic
management, the more they are inclined to perceive increasing risks of a
sudden stop. Here, we are coming back to the self-fulfilling prophecy.
Two out of these three
conditions have been present in the Turkish economy since one month ago,
roughly. Turkish Lira had appreciated more than what the Central Bank was
ready to accept for macroprudential reasons. So it lowered interest rates,
aiming to provoke a controlled depreciation of the Turkish lira. The interest
rates went so low that expected real interest rates became negative,
launching a debate about their sustainability. This debate is fully justified
because
So, most of the
ingredients for the sudden stop that started last week were already present
in the Turkish economy. As for the investor confidence issue, we can't yet
say that it has definitely started weakening. Nevertheless, we should admit
that our governors have done all they can in this respect. Accusing an
obscure interest lobby of provoking a sudden stop and a rapid deprecation of
the Turkish lira as well as a rapid increase of market interest rates is
certainly not the right approach to calm down already nervous investors. This
is because it reveals an absolutely wrong reading of the events that are
happening and at the same time increases worries about the government's
ability to properly manage an open market economy suffering from some
fragilities.
What is most
dangerous, I think, in this approach is that it takes the Central Bank's
monetary policy prisoner. At the moment, the Central Bank prefers to use its
hard currency reserves to end the sudden stop, hoping that outside and inside
To end this article,
let me recall the infamous battle former Prime Minister Tansu Çiller waged
against market interest rates in November 1993, triggering a full-fledged
financial crisis. The Turkish economy today is far more structurally strong
than it was in the 1990s and a financial crisis is not likely. But a recession
is possible.
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1 Haziran 2013 Cumartesi
OECD forecasts low growth for Turkey
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I hesitated between two subjects for
today’s article. After a long period of deliberation, the draft of a new
income tax law was finally submitted to Parliament on Wednesday.
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On the same day, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published its
new forecasts for the Turkish economy. I think it would be better to first
talk about the OECD forecasts despite the importance of the tax reforms. This
issue can wait until Tuesday, all the more so since we will be discussing it
passionately in the coming weeks.
According to the
OECD’s “Turkey - Economic forecast summary (2013)”: “Following weak growth in
2012, as consumption and investment contracted and offset a surge in exports,
the economy is now regaining momentum. Growth is projected to rise to above
3% in 2013 and, as the global recovery gathers strength, to pick up to 4½ per
cent in 2014. Inflation and the current account deficit both remain above
comfort levels, however.” I agree with the gist of this statement. But as
usual, the devil is in details so, let’s look at them.
The OECD’s growth
forecast for
I would like to note
that there is dangerous confusion regarding the monetary policy. As is clearly
expressed in the last Monetary Policy Committee (PPK) statement, lowering the
interest rates is aimed at preventing further appreciation of the lira, which
is already slightly overvalued, by discouraging excessive short-term capital
inflows. At the same time, the central bank is trying to control credit
expansion by squeezing the money supply in order to prevent an uncontrollable
increase in domestic demand. This policy approach does not satisfy the
proponents of acceleration. They demand an aggressive loosening of monetary
policy.
The low growth
perspective is central to this opposition within the AK Party. If the debate
has not yet turned into an open fight, this is because despite low growth,
unemployment is not growing too fast. I have explained many times before in
this column that this fortunate state of events is due to the high job
creation capacity of growth prevalent in recent years. I do not think that
this good fortune will continue in the near future. The OECD’s recent report
forecasts an increase in the unemployment rate from 9 percent in 2012 to 9.4
percent in 2013. I believe that this forecast can be seen as a rather
optimistic one.
Another question mark
regarding the OECD’s forecast is related to the current account deficit
(CAD). The OECD thinks that exports of goods and services will increase by
4.9 percent and imports by 3.3 percent in 2013, causing a modest increase in
the current account ratio to gross domestic product (GDP) that would reach
6.2 percent in 2013, up from 6 percent. I also consider this forecast rather
optimistic. Yesterday, the Turkish Statistics Institute (TurkStat) published
April’s foreign trade statistics. Seasonally adjusted exports had decreased
by 1.6 percent compared to March, while imports had increased by 10.7 percent.
Even if we exclude imports of gold, which showed a sudden jump in April, the
growth rate of imports still remains high at 6.6 percent according to
To sum up, it is quite
probable that the GDP will remain below 4 percent in the future, causing a
higher unemployment rate and CAD than expected. This state of affairs will be
unacceptable for the AK Party government as the elections marathon will kick
off soon.
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27 Nisan 2013 Cumartesi
Peace process going well but not the economy
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The “peace process” aiming to put an end
to the bloody and wearing “low intensity war” between the Turkish Armed
Forces (TSK) and Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militants is under way. The
day before, the PKK officially announced the withdrawal of its armed teams
from
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The end of armed
clashes along with the democratization of the Kurdish problem will certainly
bring beneficial economic results, but the so-called “peace dividends” would
not be, unfortunately, as high as expected. (See my March 18 column, “Peace
dividends”) All of the energy and attention of the government -- particularly
that of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose energy and attention
matter more than those of others -- are focused on the peace process. This is
quite understandable, but this cannot be a pretext to neglect the economy,
all the more since the economy is not doing well.
Readers of this column
are familiar with my worries, which are shared by most of the economists who
are watching
Another bit of bad
news is in regards to the evolution of the real exchange rate. It had already
entered the red zone, as defined by the Central Bank of
Is further loosening
of monetary policy needed? And if yes, is it possible? Let me first remark
that the expected real interest rate is already in the negative zone, as
inflation expectations are still well over 6 percent. I do not think that
there remains too much room for the monetary policy cabale to contribute
further to the domestic demand revival. More loosening could conflict with
the fight against inflation.
Under these
circumstances, a balanced growth based on domestic and, at the same time,
external demand seems pretty much impossible. There is still some hope to
have a growth rate, say something between 3 and 4 percent, but it will be
only an emanation of the domestic demand. So, we will be back again at the
start -- an increasing current account deficit with, as a bonus, indomitable
inflation.
How to get out from
these dilemmas? The only way, I believe, is a shock of reforms. All reform
projects, such as severance pay reform, tax reform, etc., which are already
finalized but postponed for political reasons, should be implemented as soon
as possible. Other reforms aiming for things like more flexibility in the
labor market and more fiscal autonomy for the universities must be designed
and implemented. The only good news on the reforms' front is the recent
admission by Parliament of a new electricity law which is able to make
electricity production and distribution more competitive and more efficient.
However, the Turkish economy, admittedly, needs more reforms as soon as
possible.
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19 Nisan 2013 Cuma
Limits of monetary policy
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The Monetary Policy Committee (PPK) of
the Central Bank of
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I think there is a
large consensus regarding the main goal: The central bank wants to prevent
further appreciation of the Turkish lira which has already crossed the red
line set by itself. The central bank announced recently that the real
exchange rate index would be entering the alarming zone over 120. The index
is already there. Moreover, it will certainly be continuing to increase since
the Turkish inflation rate is higher than its trading partners. The
appreciation of the Turkish lira threatens the so-called “balanced growth”
and the financial stability that is so intensely desired by the central bank
through losses in the competitiveness of Turkish exports and excessive credit
expansion.
The following
assertions from the MPC release should be underlined: “Recently, there is a
reacceleration in capital inflows and credit growth hovers above the
reference rate. The committee indicated that, in order to balance the risks
on financial stability, the proper policy would be to keep interest rates low
while increasing foreign currency reserves via macro prudential measures.
Accordingly, it was deemed appropriate to further increase the reserve
options coefficients, while delivering a cut in the short-term interest
rates.”
I fully agree with the
central bank on the balanced growth goal. Economic growth exclusively based
on domestic demand would unavoidably have an adverse effect on the current
account deficit (CAD). The last figures show that the CAD-to-gross domestic
product (GDP) ratio, which fell to 6 percent from 10 percent started widening
slightly again. So, the desired revival in domestic demand must be kept under
control while the supplementary growth must come from net exports. Doing so,
exports have to rise more than imports.
Now, it is not easy at
all to achieve these double goals. Keeping domestic demand under control
necessitates a rather tight monetary policy and the pursuit of fiscal
discipline. The last cuts in the central bank's interest rates pushed the
expected real interest rate in the negative zone; the indicative Treasury
Bond rate went down to 5.5 percent while expected inflation remained over 6
percent. I do not think that there is further room for interest cuts. If this
happens, credit expansion would be out of control, jeopardizing the
credibility of the central bank in its fight against inflation.
As for fiscal
discipline, it is as solid as a rock according to the latest budget figures;
the primary surplus is higher than that of last year in the first quarter.
However, the actual macroeconomic framework does not seem to be able to
produce growth close to 4 percent, which is targeted in the Medium-term
Economic Program (OVP) and constitutes the minimal rate required to prevent
unemployment to increase. Let me note that the unemployment rate, at 9.4
percent, is actually 0.4 percentage points over its level of last year. If
the growth rate remains weak, admittedly the increase in unemployment will
become more apparent and then more threatening for the government as
electoral days are approaching. It would be worth noting at this point that
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts only a 3.4 percent growth for
the Turkish economy in its latest survey released this week.
Balanced and at the
same time sufficient economic growth seems quite elusive. The central bank
would certainly prefer relatively low growth but sufficiently safe to secure
economic and financial stability, while the government prefers robust growth
enough to prevent an increase in unemployment. I do not think that the
government cares about the source of the growth. This dilemma is capable of
creating a serious rift between the central bank and some Justice and
Development Party (AK Party) ministers in the coming months. By the way, the
split is already quite visible. Mr. Zafer Çağlayan, minister of economy,
reacted to the interest rate cuts by saying, “Good, but not enough.”
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19 Mart 2013 Salı
Are the brakes burning?
The expected reaction from the “growth lobby” to an increasing
trend in unemployment was not delayed. Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan, soon
after the publication of December employment figures last Friday, reminded us
how the rise in unemployment is unacceptable, for him and probably for the
government as well. In his statement he once again used his favorite metaphor
of burning brakes: “The brakes have begun to smell. Four or five months ago,
I had warned to not push too much on the brakes. Unfortunately, the brakes
have finally started to burn. But we have not been demoralized by this. I
still hope to see better figures.”
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Mr. Çağlayan then expressed his approach to economic
policies: “From now on, we must step on the accelerator. … Each year we must
grow by 6 percent. The way to reach this target is through expansion, not
contraction. There is no need to be cautious on interest rates. They should
be lowered.”
In my column of Feb. 11 (“Worries on economic growth”), I
wrote: “… I think the available information summarized above is enough to
allow me to express some reflections on an important consequence of low
growth. Further loosening monetary policy would risk jeopardizing the 5
percent inflation target. If the Central Bank maintains its actual stance,
the already existing signals of an upturn in unemployment would become more
perceptible. This will increase, for sure, the political pressures on the
central bank's management.” I was not mistaken. Economic policies have
arrived at a crossroad. The soft landing that was desired did not occur. The
landing was rather hard, as the 2012 growth rate is expected to certainly
fall below 3 percent.
That said, Mr. Çağlayan is mistaken in believing that low
growth is responsible for increasing unemployment. As I explained in my
column on Saturday, despite the low growth rate, Turkish corporations and the
state created lots of jobs last year, to the degree that the growth rate of
employment exceeded that of gross domestic product (GDP). Unemployment is
rising not because of insufficient employment but because of a strong growth
of the labor force, particularly in the numbers of women.
I believe these anomalies cannot maintain themselves, at
least if economic theory and common sense prevail. I am afraid that Mr.
Çağlayan, who hopes to see better figures in the coming months, risks being
disappointed. If GDP growth maintains its pace at around 3 percent, rising
employment will unavoidably decelerate. Even in the case of a deceleration in
the growth of the labor force, I believe we should still expect rising
unemployment.
Unemployment is indeed the main threat to economic
stability. I agree with Mr. Çağlayan that growth should be accelerated. The 6
percent target announced by the economy minister is out of range, but 4
percent is achievable. This could also be just enough to calm the worries
regarding rising unemployment. But how? This is the critical question
economists are asking themselves nowadays. The answers vary. The central bank
and Treasury are confident that the 4 percent growth will come partly from
external demand and partly from domestic demand. Let me remind you that last
year domestic demand did not contribute at all to growth. However, the
central bank and some economists do not think that radical changes in
economic policies are needed.
Some others, like Mr. Çağlayan, defend the argument that
further loosening in monetary policy and the depreciation of the Turkish lira
are necessary. At the moment, no one defends the loosening of fiscal
discipline; Mehmet Şimşek, the minister of finance, announced last Friday
that budget performance for the first two months is better than that of last
year. This is good news. But if the state of the budget is revealed to be
insufficient to revive domestic demand and/or exports fall further behind
imports, what will happen to the moderately expansionist monetary policy and
to the moderately tight fiscal policy?
Personally, I think that there is no room for further
lowering interest rates. The real interest rate has already come down to as
low 1 percent, and the central bank is neither able nor willing to lower it.
A limited depreciation of the Turkish lira will certainly aid growth, but the
way to realize that process is not evident in the slightest. Thus it remains
in the hands of fiscal policy. Let's hope that growth will resume in the
coming months, just enough to stop the rise of unemployment and just enough
to limit the unavoidable increase of the current account deficit.
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5 Mart 2013 Salı
Is education a panacea?
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I was thinking to continue with the
employment issue for today by focusing on education presented as a panacea
and some times as a miraculous cure for improving the state of economic
development. But I felt the need to check the number of columns I reserved
recently on this field; I was surprised to notice that my last five columns
were on subjects related to the labor market issues in one manner or other.
While I was about to decide to shift into another field, I listened Saturday
morning to George Papandreou, former Greek prime minister and president of
the Socialist International (SI). Papandreou was invited to İstanbul by two
Turkish Social Democrat think tanks, Turkish Social Economic Political
Research Foundation (TÜSES) and the Social Democracy Foundation (SODEV) and
by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), the German Social Democrat think tank.
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The SI president
spoke, as it could be expected, about the socialist movement's policy
responses to the problems arising from the clash between conditions imposed
by irreversible globalization and the established social rights and welfare
inside the limits of the old nation state. Saturday's conference was for me
another occasion to note how terms like “educational reform,” “better
education,” etc. constitute the leitmotiv in social democratic programs. To
be fair, I should say that Papandreou pointed out the necessity of investing
more in research and development (R&D) as well as in infrastructure to
restart the growth machine, but finally it is obvious that great hope is
being placed in education to cure structural illnesses.
The Republican
People's Party (CHP), a member of the Socialist International, does not
constitute an exception. Its spokespeople also present educational reform as
almost a unique step for solving our economic problems and they are not alone
in this hope. The vice president in charge of economic affairs Ali Babacan
does not miss a single occasion without mentioning how educational reform is
important for
No doubt, providing
“more and better education” constitutes the main challenge for
So, the question is
what to do with the existing working age population, of which the majority is
poorly educated and unskilled? Creating new jobs, particularly for women,
should be accelerated as well as the increase of the labor productivity if we
want a high and sustainable economic growth. This can not be achieved without
courageous reforms in the labor market and without the help of large and
efficient “on the job training” schemes. Now, let me point out that the
government postponed indefinitely all labor market reform projects that were
designed in the National Employment Strategy.
Let me finish with
another concern. More education alone could create more problems than it
solves, if it is not placed within of a comprehensive and consistent growth
strategy. One of the facts that struck me in the recent World Development
Report 2013 - Jobs, was the very high unemployment rate among university
graduates in
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2 Mart 2013 Cumartesi
Productivity or employment
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This week, I participated in press
conferences in both İstanbul and
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Nowadays, most
countries suffer from high unemployment but also from what the World Bank
calls “bad jobs,” that is, from unproductive, unsecure employment. Many
countries still face the difficult problem of transforming millions of
informal, poorly productive jobs -- in agriculture, for example -- into
formal wage jobs. Let me just offer one figure in order the express the
extent of the employment challenge the world is facing: According to Word
Bank estimates, 600 million jobs need to be created in the next 15 years just
to maintain current employment rates.
The most striking
feature of the report, I think, is that it takes into account the diversity of
conditions prevailing in each country regarding economic development and the
labor market. The World Bank identified eight categories of countries
according to these conditions and explained how the nature of “good jobs” --
in other words, proper growth and employment strategies -- differs in each of
them. To give you an idea of this diversity, I would like to note that a
growth-employment strategy in an “agrarian economy” should not be similar to
that of an “aging society.”
During these two press
conferences, I focused my comments on four questions that constitute
passionately debated subjects in Turkey: first, how increases in productivity
versus employment must be balanced in terms of growth; second, how to
integrate members of the youth population who are not working, studying or
looking for a job into the labor market; third, what should be done with the
existing stock of poorly educated, unskilled people; and fourth, how to
address the issue of an aging population.
The issues of idle
youth and the aging population have been discussed recently in this column.
So, allow me this time to focus on the first issue I addressed at the press
conferences. In the period preceding the global recession, which was
characterized by high growth (roughly 6 percent per year), most economists
and the press in
I had two objections
to this assertion, however. First, this economic growth was in fact creating
enough jobs in non-agricultural sectors as this type of employment increased
approximately 3 percent between 2003 and 2008. Secondly, this outcome cannot
be considered a valid point of complaint for three basic reasons: The
unemployment rate was kept around 10 percent, the high growth allowed for the
move of people from poorly productive agricultural jobs into productive
non-agricultural jobs and the value added workers increased rapidly, pushing
up wages and overall per capita income.
In the aftermath of
the global recession, not only did very high growth prevail -- on average
around 9 percent in 2010 and 2011 -- but it started to create a lot of jobs
-- maybe too many! Indeed, the yearly increase in employment reached 6
percent in this period, significantly pushing up the capacity of growth to
create jobs. Even in 2012, when growth decelerated tremendously, the
increase in employment continued. One should note that this strong increase
in employment in recent years is partly due to a surprising increase in
agricultural jobs, with much of the remaining job creation happening in the
service sector.
So, we are no longer
hearing the complaint about “jobless growth,” but should we happy about that?
I am not sure. It is true that the unemployment rate has decreased by about
one percentage point over the pre-crisis period and that labor force
participation has increased. However, the increase worker productivity has
decelerated significantly, to the point of nearly stagnating in the past
year. Admittedly, the ideal situation for growth with regards to the
productivity-employment balance would be one that is based mostly on
productivity gains while at the same time allowing unemployment to decrease
slightly. However, this is easier said than done.
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