growth etiketine sahip kayıtlar gösteriliyor. Tüm kayıtları göster
growth etiketine sahip kayıtlar gösteriliyor. Tüm kayıtları göster

4 Mart 2014 Salı

Central bank facing new challenges

Consumer prices published yesterday indicate a rise in the momentum of inflation. Annualized inflation increased from 7.75 in January to 7.9 percent in February; this may be considered quite moderate, but we have observed dangerous increases in the core inflation indicators (H and I indices).
Indeed, in February, the H inflation index increased from 7.7 to 8.6 percent and the I increased from 7.6 to 8.4 percent on a yearl basis. These results are clear signs of increasing inflation in the coming months.
In its last quarterly report on inflation, the Central Bank of Turkey was already obliged to increase its year-end inflation forecast from 6.2 percent to 6.8 percent. A second revision is now unavoidable. We will know the new forecast in April, when the second inflation report will be published. But we can almost be sure that the new forecast will be over 7 percent. Inflation is not getting closer to its target of 5 percent; on the contrary, it is moving away from it. One can say that this is not a new thing since this has been the case for years. The central bank will, once again, have to write a letter to the government, as the law requires, explaining that the culprit for increased inflation is the depreciation of the Turkish lira.
I am not sure that the rise in inflation is that simple and won't affect our lives.
Repeated failures concerning inflation put the credibility of the central bank at stake. Furthermore, open political pressure on the central bank's management, exerted by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself and by some other ministers criticizing interest rate increases, have established an unhealthy environment. The central bank cannot escape from its main duty: price stability. In Turkey, this means lowering the inflation rate close to the targeted 5 percent and keeping it there until a new target is set.
Notes from the Monetary Policy Committee (PPK) extraordinary meeting of Jan. 28 indicate that this reality was clearly brought up: “In order to contain the deterioration in inflation expectations and pricing behavior, the committee implemented strong and frontloaded monetary tightening. … A tight monetary policy stance will be maintained until there is significant improvement in the inflation outlook.”
Well said! However, there is a problem. Paradoxically, this tightening occurs in the context of low economic growth. Usually, monetary tightening is implemented when demand exceeds potential growth, in other words, when the economy grows too much that it leads to an increase in prices.
Now, in our case, inflation is actually rising because of rising import prices due to the recent depreciation of the Turkish lira and, to some extent, because of the rise in food prices. One can claim that the depreciation is pushing inflation up, but this is a transitory effect and if the exchange rate is stabilized and the tight monetary policy is maintained, the rise in inflation would be reversed within a few months.
That is true. The exchange rate seems to be stabilized, at least for this moment, but at a rather high level. This is good news for export-led growth. We may expect a positive contribution of net exports (exports growing more rapidly than imports). Nevertheless, it is not sure that the positive contribution of net exports would be sufficient to compensate an eventual decline in domestic demand. All leading indicators in this respect are in the red. The central bank's management is aware of this eventuality. One can read in the committee's meeting notes: “There is a gradual slowdown in loan growth stemming from the tight monetary policy stance, the recent macro-prudential measures and weak capital flows. The data regarding the first quarter of 2014 indicate some deceleration in final domestic demand.”
I believe pursuing tight monetary policy in the context of low economic growth would not be an easy task at all for the central bank. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government will test its popularity very soon -- in local elections on March 30. If the results from the ballot boxes are not satisfying for AKP rulers, they will be all the more worried for the presidential and general elections to follow, since the low economic growth will become more apparent and its adverse consequences on the social front will be felt even more. Given the approach of Erdoğan and his inner circle to the monetary policy, we can easily predict that they will not accept being simple spectators who simply wonder what the central bank is going to do. Frankly speaking, I am worried about the central bank in terms of the political pressures it will be facing in the near future.

22 Şubat 2014 Cumartesi

Where I agree and disagree with Babacan

No way out without reforms
Last Monday, in an interview on TV, Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan made some important assessments of the hot issues that Turkey is trying to handle.These assessments are worth discussing since they are rather realistic and not pure political propaganda. I saw five major topics in Babacan's assessments: the policies of the Central Bank of Turkey, the state of unemployment and its future in terms of economic growth, the sustainability of the current account deficit (CAD) and, finally, the need for reforms.
Minister Babacan started by saying there is no crisis; thus there is no need for a comprehensive economic package. So we can now stop fretting ourselves by trying to guess what kind of measures may come with the famous “Plan B and Plan C” announced by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan just after the central bank decided to increase interest rates. Erdoğan said last month that an "out of the ordinary" economic package alternative to interest rate hikes could be announced. He added that work on a Plan B or Plan C may be announced in the coming days or weeks.
We have heard nothing but rumors circulating about these mysterious alternative plans so far.
Regarding monetary policy, Babacan reiterated his support for the unconventional policies of the central bank. He argued that the interest rate corridor instrument (multiple and varying interest rates) had prevented inflows of large quantities of short-term capital. As a result, he said, the impact of the US Federal Reserve's policy and the Dec. 17 corruption scandal on outflows had been mitigated, since there was no great quantity of hot money in Turkey. I agree. This point is often missed in the debate about the central bank's monetary policy. That said, I do not agree with Mr. Babacan when he says that the central bank was not wrong in delaying its interest rate decision. Indeed, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPK) refused to move on the issue during its meeting in January, but it was obliged to increase interest rates a few days later in an extraordinary meeting because investors had started to sell their Turkish Lira denominated assets in a panic, causing a dangerous shift in the exchange rate.
Mr. Babacan argued that this panic was due to the serious turmoil that had occurred in Argentina and Russia two or three days after the MPK's meeting. This argument is hardly convincing. Personally, I think the political pressure on the central bank was so stifling that the MPK was not courageous enough to increase interest rates earlier, hoping that this omission would not affect investors' behavior. It was a great mistake.
However, I fully agree with Babacan's assessment of the evolution of unemployment. He was right in pointing out that the rate of unemployment had been on an upward path, but that during the last two months of 2013 it leveled off. He added, “It is too early to make a comment, but if we see our growth in gross domestic product [GDP] below 4 percent, then the jobless rates could be relatively higher.” So the critical issue is expected growth this year. On this point, the deputy prime minister was rather cautious. After saying that growth performance will depend both on domestic demand and exports, he indicated that it is still too early to make a projection on domestic demand, but expectations on exports to the EU market are promising. Unlike Mr. Babacan, I am almost certain that domestic demand, particularly demand for investment and durable consumer goods in the first quarter, will be very weak. But Babacan is right to expect that there will be more exports to the EU. Last year, these exports grew for the first time since the eruption of the economic crisis. This year, the EU economy seems to be in better shape. So we can count on exports to the EU market.
I wrote in a previous column that my growth-rate forecast for this year is around 2.5 percent. Since then, many other predictions have been published. Even the most optimistic ones do not predict a rate over 3 percent. If these turn out to be correct, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) will be faced with increasing unemployment and stagnating well-being. The deputy prime minister is certainly aware of this challenge. As he pointed out, the Turkish economy is unable to have 4-5 percent growth without lowering its CAD to a sustainable level. Mr. Babacan thinks that this level might be 4-5 percent, but the deficit must be even lower in the long run. Let me point out that the CAD/GDP ratio is actually over 7 percent.
Admittedly, the challenge is a difficult one. This may be the reason why Babacan insisted once again on economic reforms during his interview. The fact that he insisted on reforms shows great virtue in these days of political madness.

7 Şubat 2014 Cuma

USD per capita income stagnating

Readers should be aware of the 2023 economic target set by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, but let me bring it up again: Turkish gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to reach $2 trillion, with a per capita income of $25,000 when the centenary of the Turkish Republic is celebrated. The per capita income will have more than doubled in 10 years, making Turkey a developed country and, at the same time, a global power. Needless to say, this more than ambitious economic target constitutes a key propaganda item for the AKP, aiming to stay in power for another 10 years, if not more. However, this target is definitely in jeopardy. Let me explain.
A per capita income of $25,000 was already out of reach when it was announced two years ago but it was possible to hope for a figure close to $20,000 at least. Indeed, assuming that real GDP income growth would be as high as in the 2002-2011 period -- around 6 percent -- and also assuming that the lira would continue its upward trend in the next decade, a per capita income of $20,000 would have been a realistic target. The graph below asserts that from 2002 to 2011, per capita income rose from $4,000 to $10,000, by 150 percent. Roughly half of this increase came from real GDP growth, increasing by almost 60 percent -- the graph shows the index for real GDP increasing from 100 in 2002 to almost 160 in 2011 -- while the other half came from the strong appreciation of the lira in real terms.
However, this high growth-strong lira period is definitely over because of one simple reason: The pursuit of domestic demand-led growth fueled by foreign borrowing is impossible from now on. Many factors lie behind this impossibility: The domestic demand-led growth regime coupled with low domestic savings drove the current account deficit (CAD) to unsustainable levels; an international liquidity glut easing foreign borrowing is ending; and, last but not least, total factor productivity growth, a key factor of the competitive strength of the economy, has dramatically decreased over the last few years (See my article “Turkey on the brink of middle of income trap,” Sept. 2, 2013). Under these circumstances you cannot have either high real GDP growth or a continuously appreciating lira.
Thus, the stagnation of per capita income at $10,600 over the last two years must not be considered a surprise (See graph). Indeed, the average growth rate has barely reached 3 percent -- 2.2 percent in 2012 and it is expected to stand around 4 percent in 2013 -- while the lira has been depreciated sizably. This low growth-weak lira episode should not be considered as transitory. This year, one expects not only a growth rate of below 3 percent at best, but at the same time, the depreciation of the lira of over 10 percent which occurred in January will hardly be reversed. Thus you should not be surprised if we witness a decrease of per capita income in dollar terms in 2014.
You can ask, “What about the remaining years?” Well, this depends on real GDP growth as well as on productivity performance. All productivity and balanced growth enhancing economic reforms have been postponed to after the general elections, which will be held at the latest in May 2015. It is difficult to predict what the electoral outcomes will be and their effect on political developments for the incumbent party. But even if the AKP government is strong enough to enhance the structural reforms required, the Turkish economy can have at best 5 percent real GDP growth (its estimated potential) along with a limited appreciation of the lira.
This means that a per capita income close to $18,000 by 2023 would already be a challenging target. I recommend that AKP managers focus on solutions to existing structural economic problems rather than searching for scapegoats.
US dollar per capita income and real GDP growth (2002-2013)


24 Eylül 2013 Salı

TÜSİAD on domestic savings

Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) President Muharrem Yılmaz said on Friday that the quality of economic growth will carry significant importance in the coming years, echoing recent comments by Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan.
Yılmaz added that Turkey's growth model needs to be reconsidered and that Turkey needs to take bold, determined steps in three areas: boosting domestic savings, successfully completing the settlement process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and making structural reforms. The settlement process is widely commented on every day by the columnists of Today's Zaman. Let me focus on domestic savings, which has multiple links with structural reforms. 
TÜSİAD President Muharrem Yılmaz worried on savings and reforms


The ratio of domestic savings to gross domestic product (GDP) has declined dramatically since 2000, from more than 20 percent in the 1990s to 12 percent in 2012. Low domestic savings is certainly the most important obstacle but not the only one to balanced, satisfactory economic growth. A sizable increase in domestic savings is a necessary condition for the growth regime to change, but it will not be sufficient alone. The Turkish economy must at the same time be able to export the surplus of goods that will not be consumed in the domestic market due to the increase in savings. If not, the economy will go into recession due to insufficient aggregate demand. We know this because of the “paradox of thrift” popularized by John Maynard Keynes. This paradox would be mitigated by Turkish industry strengthening its competitiveness, which would require radical reforms in education, innovation, etc., as stated by Babacan and reiterated by Yılmaz.
The TÜSİAD president said that at least three percentage points must be added to the current domestic savings rate. This effort would not be enough, but it would certainly be welcome. Yılmaz noted policies in a five-year plan that aim to increase domestic savings: fighting the informal economy, strengthening the social security model, enhancing insurance systems and facilitating access to financial tools. I must say that even if these goals are achieved, they will hardly increase the domestic savings rate by three percentage points.
Indeed, the first two policies aim to increase public savings. Public savings constitutes approximately 3 percent of GDP. Even if different aspects of the informal economy are addressed, such as the non-registration and under-registration of wage earners in the social security system, public income would only rise 0.3 percentage points at best, according to my estimations. If serious income tax reform to widen the tax base is implemented to complement the fight against the informal economy, then public savings would certainly increase further. Nevertheless, even a one percentage point increase in GDP -- which would mean more than a 30 percent increase of public savings -- would be a great success. That said, do not forget that increasing the average tax rate would also adversely influence the savings of households and companies through the crowding out effect.
The remaining two percentage points should come from the savings of households and companies. Here we have a basic problem. In the case of household savings, I should remark that it would be very difficult to change the current consumption patterns of Turkish households. They have started to consume more, thus save less thanks to the credit glut and much lower interest rates than in the 1990s. Households are also much less worried about unexpected health expenses thanks to improved and extended social coverage. The two policies in the five-year plan aiming to boost private savings only “enhance insurance systems and facilitate access to financial tools.” These policies may well be helpful, but only marginally. The best tool in this area would be radical severance pay reform, but this reform project continues to rot in the drawer.
So, what about the savings of companies? Nobody talks about this burning issue. Turkish corporations can save more if profits increase and are then invested instead of distributed to shareholders. The most straightforward way to increase profits would be to decrease wages, but this can hardly be done. The cost of labor may be lowered, but this would require difficult labor market reforms. Another option is the depreciation of the lira as this would boost export profits, but this has its limits because of high inflation. Indeed, the most effective option would be to increase productivity. This is possible if comprehensive productivity-enhancing reforms in education, technology and innovation are realized, as was underlined by the TÜSİAD president. We are impatiently awaiting them.

2 Eylül 2013 Pazartesi

Turkey on the brink of middle income trap

Turkey has had an astonishing performance with regards to income per capita in the last decade. Indeed, the per capita income has risen from $3,000 to $11,000 under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Encouraged by this performance, the AK Party set very ambitious goals for the next decade, feeling confident that it would be possible to repeat this great performance in the future. Indeed, the AK Party is aiming for per capita income of $25,000 by 2023. I tried to explain several times before in this column that there is little chance of doing so. This time I would like to share with readers further evidence to back my claim.
The Bahçeşehir University Center for Economic and Social Research (BETAM) last week published a research paper titled "Türkiye orta gelir tuzağının eşiğinde" (Turkey on the brink of the middle income trap). As one of the authors of this research, let me explain briefly how the idea for this subject came about. At BETAM we have for years now been closely scrutinizing the Turkish labor market, publishing a monthly “Labor Market Outlook” and a number of occasional research briefs on various labor issues. It was surprising to observe continued high job creation despite the huge decline in the growth rate in the last two years. The factors behind this “happy” event are still not clear. Based on the findings of some preliminary research we suspected that the incentives intending to lower labor costs (such as subsidies for social security premiums) would have contributed to this nice surprise regarding unemployment.
But considering the quality of growth as well as the per capita income performance, it was not difficult to predict the existence of some problems, particularly regarding the evolution of labor productivity. Thus, we decided to look more closely at this aspect using a simple decomposition methodology that allows us to break down the per capita income increase into its three contributors: the ratio of the working age population to the total population; the employment ratio (employment /working age population); and labor productivity, defined as the gross domestic product (GDP) per employed individual.
The contribution of the working age population ratio is marginal. Though the working age population is still growing more rapidly than the total population, this factor will be extending into the 2020s because of an aging population. As for the two other factors, namely the employment ratio and labor productivity, three different periods are observed. Before the Great Recession in 2009, from 2005 to 2008 high growth was driven almost by labor productivity increases, with the index of labor productivity rising from 100 to 109.6. During this period, total employment almost stagnated, though non-farming employment rose remarkably. Indeed, agricultural employment declined strongly, thus contributing -- via the composition effect -- to the increase of overall labor productivity while labor productivity was also increasing in non-agricultural sectors.
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the nature of growth changed dramatically. From 2009 to 2011, though the Turkish economy had high growth rates, both the increase in the employment ratio and the increase of labor productivity contributed more or less equally to the increase of per capita income. However, since 2012, not only did the growth rate decrease dramatically but the increase in labor productivity first stopped and later started to decrease, as BETAM's research shows. Indeed, the index of labor productivity decreased from 105.8 to 104.8 from the second quarter of 2011 to the first quarter of 2013. Thus, for two years now, under the combined effect of low growth and declining labor productivity, the increase of income per capita is almost stagnating.
Obviously, if this poor growth performance continues to prevail, the per capita income of $25,000 targeted for 2023 will never be reached. Moreover, the Turkish economy risks being trapped in the middle-income group of countries since increases in the per capita income will be very slow, if not stagnating. High job creation is certainly good for keeping unemployment in check. Nevertheless, labor productivity must start to increase again in order to continue to increase social welfare. The Turkish economy needs growth rates higher than the current one hovering around 3.5 percent actually. Moreover, this additional growth should come from labor productivity gains.

25 Haziran 2013 Salı

The ‘sudden stop' threat

While I asked in this column on Saturday if the “Turkish economy is on the eve of a recession,” Professor Daron Acemoğlu from MIT was speaking the same day at Bilgi University about the risk of a “sudden stop” in the Turkish economy.


Turkish Central Bank became prisoner of the intereset rate lobby discourse 
A hot debate is open. Let's first briefly explain the “sudden stop” for readers unfamiliar with the concept. In an economy where capital movements are free, short-term investments and capital inflows can change direction and leave the recipient country very quickly from time to time. The reversal of capital flows depends basically on an eventual risk of capital losses due to a decrease in asset prices. When this eventuality is perceived by the majority of investors, they simply take home their money.
A number of factors can cause such behavior, and there is no need to invent an “interest lobby” to explain the sudden stop phenomenon. For a foreign investor who exchanged some amount of dollars into Turkish lira and invested it in Turkish-lira denominated assets, the value of the Turkish lira becomes a decisive parameter. If the majority of investors start expecting an imminent depreciation of the local currency, it is quite rational for them to sell their assets before this depreciation occurs. And when sales begin, asset prices start decreasing.
Economists call this a “self-fulfilling prophecy.” Of course the risks and consequences of the sudden stop vary from one economy to another. The lower local interest rates are compared with the expected interest rates of safe assets like American Treasury bonds or Eurobonds, the higher the risk of a sudden stop. The larger the current account deficit in an economy and the more over-financed it is by short-term capital flows, the more likely this economy is to face a sudden stop. And last but not least, the weaker investors' confidence in economic management, the more they are inclined to perceive increasing risks of a sudden stop. Here, we are coming back to the self-fulfilling prophecy.
Two out of these three conditions have been present in the Turkish economy since one month ago, roughly. Turkish Lira had appreciated more than what the Central Bank was ready to accept for macroprudential reasons. So it lowered interest rates, aiming to provoke a controlled depreciation of the Turkish lira. The interest rates went so low that expected real interest rates became negative, launching a debate about their sustainability. This debate is fully justified because Turkey still carries one of the highest current account deficits in the world. Moreover, this deficit is mostly financed by short-term capital flows. In this context came Bernanke's statement regarding an eventual tightening of the FED's monetary policy in the future if the US economy continues its recovery. Then US Treasury bonds' interest rates increased slightly.
So, most of the ingredients for the sudden stop that started last week were already present in the Turkish economy. As for the investor confidence issue, we can't yet say that it has definitely started weakening. Nevertheless, we should admit that our governors have done all they can in this respect. Accusing an obscure interest lobby of provoking a sudden stop and a rapid deprecation of the Turkish lira as well as a rapid increase of market interest rates is certainly not the right approach to calm down already nervous investors. This is because it reveals an absolutely wrong reading of the events that are happening and at the same time increases worries about the government's ability to properly manage an open market economy suffering from some fragilities.
What is most dangerous, I think, in this approach is that it takes the Central Bank's monetary policy prisoner. At the moment, the Central Bank prefers to use its hard currency reserves to end the sudden stop, hoping that outside and inside Turkey there will soon be enough good news to reverse current adverse expectations. However, it may be obliged to use its interest rate weapon, since its reserves are rather limited. If this need appears, it will be not easy for the Turkish Central Bank's management, albeit independent by law, to pull out the interest rate weapon since the government firmly condemns high interest rates as the mother of all badness.
To end this article, let me recall the infamous battle former Prime Minister Tansu Çiller waged against market interest rates in November 1993, triggering a full-fledged financial crisis. The Turkish economy today is far more structurally strong than it was in the 1990s and a financial crisis is not likely. But a recession is possible. 

1 Haziran 2013 Cumartesi

OECD forecasts low growth for Turkey

I hesitated between two subjects for today’s article. After a long period of deliberation, the draft of a new income tax law was finally submitted to Parliament on Wednesday.


On the same day, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published its new forecasts for the Turkish economy. I think it would be better to first talk about the OECD forecasts despite the importance of the tax reforms. This issue can wait until Tuesday, all the more so since we will be discussing it passionately in the coming weeks.
Ali Babacan & Zafer Çağlayan: Prudence versus audacity
According to the OECD’s “Turkey - Economic forecast summary (2013)”: “Following weak growth in 2012, as consumption and investment contracted and offset a surge in exports, the economy is now regaining momentum. Growth is projected to rise to above 3% in 2013 and, as the global recovery gathers strength, to pick up to 4½ per cent in 2014. Inflation and the current account deficit both remain above comfort levels, however.” I agree with the gist of this statement. But as usual, the devil is in details so, let’s look at them.
The OECD’s growth forecast for Turkey this year is 3.1 percent. The first item to note is that the growth rate is well below the 4 percent targeted in the government’s Medium-term Economic Program (OVP). If growth remains at this level -- and I think that this is a rather realistic forecast -- the actual debate on monetary policy will become heated. The official growth target of 4 percent was already not well received by some ministers. The existence of contradictory approaches to monetary policy within the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is not a state secret. Those partial to a push on the gas pedal continue to claim that interest rates are still high, despite the central bank’s recent reduction. It is worth reiterating that the expected real interest rates are currently in the negative zone, and this situation is currently considered by certain economists, including myself, as a potential risk for inflation and savings.
I would like to note that there is dangerous confusion regarding the monetary policy. As is clearly expressed in the last Monetary Policy Committee (PPK) statement, lowering the interest rates is aimed at preventing further appreciation of the lira, which is already slightly overvalued, by discouraging excessive short-term capital inflows. At the same time, the central bank is trying to control credit expansion by squeezing the money supply in order to prevent an uncontrollable increase in domestic demand. This policy approach does not satisfy the proponents of acceleration. They demand an aggressive loosening of monetary policy.
The low growth perspective is central to this opposition within the AK Party. If the debate has not yet turned into an open fight, this is because despite low growth, unemployment is not growing too fast. I have explained many times before in this column that this fortunate state of events is due to the high job creation capacity of growth prevalent in recent years. I do not think that this good fortune will continue in the near future. The OECD’s recent report forecasts an increase in the unemployment rate from 9 percent in 2012 to 9.4 percent in 2013. I believe that this forecast can be seen as a rather optimistic one.
Another question mark regarding the OECD’s forecast is related to the current account deficit (CAD). The OECD thinks that exports of goods and services will increase by 4.9 percent and imports by 3.3 percent in 2013, causing a modest increase in the current account ratio to gross domestic product (GDP) that would reach 6.2 percent in 2013, up from 6 percent. I also consider this forecast rather optimistic. Yesterday, the Turkish Statistics Institute (TurkStat) published April’s foreign trade statistics. Seasonally adjusted exports had decreased by 1.6 percent compared to March, while imports had increased by 10.7 percent. Even if we exclude imports of gold, which showed a sudden jump in April, the growth rate of imports still remains high at 6.6 percent according to Bahçeşehir University’s Center for Economic and Social Research’s (BETAM) estimate. This is not a good sign for the CAD. As I already pointed out, the Turkish economy seems to be trapped in a low, unbalanced and poor quality growth regime. Even if GDP growth accelerates, as forecasted by the OECD, in 2014, this will be based mostly on domestic demand, further widening the current account deficit, as noted by the OECD.
To sum up, it is quite probable that the GDP will remain below 4 percent in the future, causing a higher unemployment rate and CAD than expected. This state of affairs will be unacceptable for the AK Party government as the elections marathon will kick off soon.

27 Nisan 2013 Cumartesi

Peace process going well but not the economy

The “peace process” aiming to put an end to the bloody and wearing “low intensity war” between the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militants is under way. The day before, the PKK officially announced the withdrawal of its armed teams from Turkey to northern Iraq. If this retrieval is hopefully terminated without any provocation, the first stage of the peace process will be completed and we will finally have a peaceful environment in eastern Turkey. Admittedly, this does not signify a definite solution of the “Kurdish problem.” Other steps, like a new constitution securing democracy and human rights for all citizens -- but particularly for Kurds, are a must. This is, for sure, not an easy task, but both sides estimate that the point of no return has already been passed.


Government postponed structural reforms
The end of armed clashes along with the democratization of the Kurdish problem will certainly bring beneficial economic results, but the so-called “peace dividends” would not be, unfortunately, as high as expected. (See my March 18 column, “Peace dividends”) All of the energy and attention of the government -- particularly that of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose energy and attention matter more than those of others -- are focused on the peace process. This is quite understandable, but this cannot be a pretext to neglect the economy, all the more since the economy is not doing well.
Readers of this column are familiar with my worries, which are shared by most of the economists who are watching Turkey closely. A robust revival of domestic demand that would boost the sluggish growth is still not in sight. The leading indicators of the first two months were not very encouraging. The estimation of Bahçeşehir University's Center for Economic and Social Research (BETAM) for the yearly growth rate of the first quarter was 2.4 percent. (See my April 8 column, “A modest revival in sight”) Since then, the capacity use and real sector confidence index for March have been published. They are not encouraging, either.
Another bit of bad news is in regards to the evolution of the real exchange rate. It had already entered the red zone, as defined by the Central Bank of Turkey, before the last interest rate loosening by the Monetary Policy Committee (PPK) a week ago. It had been expected that this strong loosening would prevent the Turkish lira from continuing to appreciate through a smooth nominal exchange rate adjustment. Nevertheless, the expected effect has not seemed to be produced, since the exchange rate of the currency basket, half of which is formed by the US dollar and the other half by the euro, continues to be under TL 2.10. International liquidity is still abundant, and the interest rates of Turkish Treasury Bonds, despite their historically low levels (around 5.5 percent), are still attractive for hot money. Yesterday, the most popular economic title in the press was: “5.6 billion USD capital inflows within a month.” Now, Turkish exporters desperately look after restoring competitiveness through a real exchange rate adjustment.
Is further loosening of monetary policy needed? And if yes, is it possible? Let me first remark that the expected real interest rate is already in the negative zone, as inflation expectations are still well over 6 percent. I do not think that there remains too much room for the monetary policy cabale to contribute further to the domestic demand revival. More loosening could conflict with the fight against inflation.
Under these circumstances, a balanced growth based on domestic and, at the same time, external demand seems pretty much impossible. There is still some hope to have a growth rate, say something between 3 and 4 percent, but it will be only an emanation of the domestic demand. So, we will be back again at the start -- an increasing current account deficit with, as a bonus, indomitable inflation.
How to get out from these dilemmas? The only way, I believe, is a shock of reforms. All reform projects, such as severance pay reform, tax reform, etc., which are already finalized but postponed for political reasons, should be implemented as soon as possible. Other reforms aiming for things like more flexibility in the labor market and more fiscal autonomy for the universities must be designed and implemented. The only good news on the reforms' front is the recent admission by Parliament of a new electricity law which is able to make electricity production and distribution more competitive and more efficient. However, the Turkish economy, admittedly, needs more reforms as soon as possible.

19 Nisan 2013 Cuma

Limits of monetary policy

The Monetary Policy Committee (PPK) of the Central Bank of Turkey decided to cut interest rates by more than expected during the monthly meeting held on Tuesday. The one-week repo rate (the policy rate) has been lowered from 5.5 percent to 5 percent, while the upper limit of the interest rate corridor (the lending rate) and its lower limit (the borrowing rate) have been cut, respectively, from 7.5 percent to 7 percent and from 4.5 percent to 4 percent. The size of the cuts surprised the business community as well as market players and provoked a hot debate among economists regarding the goals pursued by the central bank and its ability to reach these goals through these strong interest rate cuts.


Governor Erdem Başçı
I think there is a large consensus regarding the main goal: The central bank wants to prevent further appreciation of the Turkish lira which has already crossed the red line set by itself. The central bank announced recently that the real exchange rate index would be entering the alarming zone over 120. The index is already there. Moreover, it will certainly be continuing to increase since the Turkish inflation rate is higher than its trading partners. The appreciation of the Turkish lira threatens the so-called “balanced growth” and the financial stability that is so intensely desired by the central bank through losses in the competitiveness of Turkish exports and excessive credit expansion.
The following assertions from the MPC release should be underlined: “Recently, there is a reacceleration in capital inflows and credit growth hovers above the reference rate. The committee indicated that, in order to balance the risks on financial stability, the proper policy would be to keep interest rates low while increasing foreign currency reserves via macro prudential measures. Accordingly, it was deemed appropriate to further increase the reserve options coefficients, while delivering a cut in the short-term interest rates.”
I fully agree with the central bank on the balanced growth goal. Economic growth exclusively based on domestic demand would unavoidably have an adverse effect on the current account deficit (CAD). The last figures show that the CAD-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, which fell to 6 percent from 10 percent started widening slightly again. So, the desired revival in domestic demand must be kept under control while the supplementary growth must come from net exports. Doing so, exports have to rise more than imports.
Now, it is not easy at all to achieve these double goals. Keeping domestic demand under control necessitates a rather tight monetary policy and the pursuit of fiscal discipline. The last cuts in the central bank's interest rates pushed the expected real interest rate in the negative zone; the indicative Treasury Bond rate went down to 5.5 percent while expected inflation remained over 6 percent. I do not think that there is further room for interest cuts. If this happens, credit expansion would be out of control, jeopardizing the credibility of the central bank in its fight against inflation.
As for fiscal discipline, it is as solid as a rock according to the latest budget figures; the primary surplus is higher than that of last year in the first quarter. However, the actual macroeconomic framework does not seem to be able to produce growth close to 4 percent, which is targeted in the Medium-term Economic Program (OVP) and constitutes the minimal rate required to prevent unemployment to increase. Let me note that the unemployment rate, at 9.4 percent, is actually 0.4 percentage points over its level of last year. If the growth rate remains weak, admittedly the increase in unemployment will become more apparent and then more threatening for the government as electoral days are approaching. It would be worth noting at this point that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts only a 3.4 percent growth for the Turkish economy in its latest survey released this week.
Balanced and at the same time sufficient economic growth seems quite elusive. The central bank would certainly prefer relatively low growth but sufficiently safe to secure economic and financial stability, while the government prefers robust growth enough to prevent an increase in unemployment. I do not think that the government cares about the source of the growth. This dilemma is capable of creating a serious rift between the central bank and some Justice and Development Party (AK Party) ministers in the coming months. By the way, the split is already quite visible. Mr. Zafer Çağlayan, minister of economy, reacted to the interest rate cuts by saying, “Good, but not enough.”

19 Mart 2013 Salı

Are the brakes burning?

Zafer Çağlayan, Minister of Economy
The expected reaction from the “growth lobby” to an increasing trend in unemployment was not delayed. Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan, soon after the publication of December employment figures last Friday, reminded us how the rise in unemployment is unacceptable, for him and probably for the government as well. In his statement he once again used his favorite metaphor of burning brakes: “The brakes have begun to smell. Four or five months ago, I had warned to not push too much on the brakes. Unfortunately, the brakes have finally started to burn. But we have not been demoralized by this. I still hope to see better figures.”


Mr. Çağlayan then expressed his approach to economic policies: “From now on, we must step on the accelerator. … Each year we must grow by 6 percent. The way to reach this target is through expansion, not contraction. There is no need to be cautious on interest rates. They should be lowered.”
In my column of Feb. 11 (“Worries on economic growth”), I wrote: “… I think the available information summarized above is enough to allow me to express some reflections on an important consequence of low growth. Further loosening monetary policy would risk jeopardizing the 5 percent inflation target. If the Central Bank maintains its actual stance, the already existing signals of an upturn in unemployment would become more perceptible. This will increase, for sure, the political pressures on the central bank's management.” I was not mistaken. Economic policies have arrived at a crossroad. The soft landing that was desired did not occur. The landing was rather hard, as the 2012 growth rate is expected to certainly fall below 3 percent.
That said, Mr. Çağlayan is mistaken in believing that low growth is responsible for increasing unemployment. As I explained in my column on Saturday, despite the low growth rate, Turkish corporations and the state created lots of jobs last year, to the degree that the growth rate of employment exceeded that of gross domestic product (GDP). Unemployment is rising not because of insufficient employment but because of a strong growth of the labor force, particularly in the numbers of women.
I believe these anomalies cannot maintain themselves, at least if economic theory and common sense prevail. I am afraid that Mr. Çağlayan, who hopes to see better figures in the coming months, risks being disappointed. If GDP growth maintains its pace at around 3 percent, rising employment will unavoidably decelerate. Even in the case of a deceleration in the growth of the labor force, I believe we should still expect rising unemployment.
Unemployment is indeed the main threat to economic stability. I agree with Mr. Çağlayan that growth should be accelerated. The 6 percent target announced by the economy minister is out of range, but 4 percent is achievable. This could also be just enough to calm the worries regarding rising unemployment. But how? This is the critical question economists are asking themselves nowadays. The answers vary. The central bank and Treasury are confident that the 4 percent growth will come partly from external demand and partly from domestic demand. Let me remind you that last year domestic demand did not contribute at all to growth. However, the central bank and some economists do not think that radical changes in economic policies are needed.

Some others, like Mr. Çağlayan, defend the argument that further loosening in monetary policy and the depreciation of the Turkish lira are necessary. At the moment, no one defends the loosening of fiscal discipline; Mehmet Şimşek, the minister of finance, announced last Friday that budget performance for the first two months is better than that of last year. This is good news. But if the state of the budget is revealed to be insufficient to revive domestic demand and/or exports fall further behind imports, what will happen to the moderately expansionist monetary policy and to the moderately tight fiscal policy?
Personally, I think that there is no room for further lowering interest rates. The real interest rate has already come down to as low 1 percent, and the central bank is neither able nor willing to lower it. A limited depreciation of the Turkish lira will certainly aid growth, but the way to realize that process is not evident in the slightest. Thus it remains in the hands of fiscal policy. Let's hope that growth will resume in the coming months, just enough to stop the rise of unemployment and just enough to limit the unavoidable increase of the current account deficit.

5 Mart 2013 Salı

Is education a panacea?

I was thinking to continue with the employment issue for today by focusing on education presented as a panacea and some times as a miraculous cure for improving the state of economic development. But I felt the need to check the number of columns I reserved recently on this field; I was surprised to notice that my last five columns were on subjects related to the labor market issues in one manner or other. While I was about to decide to shift into another field, I listened Saturday morning to George Papandreou, former Greek prime minister and president of the Socialist International (SI). Papandreou was invited to İstanbul by two Turkish Social Democrat think tanks, Turkish Social Economic Political Research Foundation (TÜSES) and the Social Democracy Foundation (SODEV) and by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), the German Social Democrat think tank.


Mohamed Bouazizi who immolated himself
The SI president spoke, as it could be expected, about the socialist movement's policy responses to the problems arising from the clash between conditions imposed by irreversible globalization and the established social rights and welfare inside the limits of the old nation state. Saturday's conference was for me another occasion to note how terms like “educational reform,” “better education,” etc. constitute the leitmotiv in social democratic programs. To be fair, I should say that Papandreou pointed out the necessity of investing more in research and development (R&D) as well as in infrastructure to restart the growth machine, but finally it is obvious that great hope is being placed in education to cure structural illnesses.
The Republican People's Party (CHP), a member of the Socialist International, does not constitute an exception. Its spokespeople also present educational reform as almost a unique step for solving our economic problems and they are not alone in this hope. The vice president in charge of economic affairs Ali Babacan does not miss a single occasion without mentioning how educational reform is important for Turkey. Although we are still waiting this reform, to give to Caesar what is Caesar's, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government sizably increased educational expenditures in recent years and compulsory education has been recently increased to 12 years. But Turkey needs much more given the pitiful state of the education level of the working age population. The average schooling for this population is roughly 7 years. For the sake of comparison let me point out that in South Korea this average reached almost 12 years. Beside quantity,quality also counts. Turkey, with Mexico, is in the bottom of the PISA ranking, an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study measuring the quality of education. We are able to well educate a small elite, but unable to provide basic skills to the huge majority.
No doubt, providing “more and better education” constitutes the main challenge for Turkey. The sooner the government starts comprehensive and radical reform in education the better it would be. But I am afraid that educational reform became in this country a panacea that would provide the opportunity to avoid difficult reforms, particularly those regarding labor market flexibility. Indeed, even if courageous education reforms are rapidly implemented, its contribution to economic development will start to emerge within a decade at the earliest.
So, the question is what to do with the existing working age population, of which the majority is poorly educated and unskilled? Creating new jobs, particularly for women, should be accelerated as well as the increase of the labor productivity if we want a high and sustainable economic growth. This can not be achieved without courageous reforms in the labor market and without the help of large and efficient “on the job training” schemes. Now, let me point out that the government postponed indefinitely all labor market reform projects that were designed in the National Employment Strategy.
Let me finish with another concern. More education alone could create more problems than it solves, if it is not placed within of a comprehensive and consistent growth strategy. One of the facts that struck me in the recent World Development Report 2013 - Jobs, was the very high unemployment rate among university graduates in Tunisia. This rate rose from 14 percent in 2005 to 30 percent in 2011. I am sure you remember well that the spark of the Arab Spring has been fired on Dec. 17, 2010, the day where Mohamed Bouazizi, a young Tunisian university graduate earning his bread as a peddler, immolated him self following the confiscation of his street cart.

2 Mart 2013 Cumartesi

Productivity or employment

This week, I participated in press conferences in both İstanbul and Ankara to announce the publication of “World Development Report 2013: Jobs,” prepared by the World Bank.


high productivity
Nowadays, most countries suffer from high unemployment but also from what the World Bank calls “bad jobs,” that is, from unproductive, unsecure employment. Many countries still face the difficult problem of transforming millions of informal, poorly productive jobs -- in agriculture, for example -- into formal wage jobs. Let me just offer one figure in order the express the extent of the employment challenge the world is facing: According to Word Bank estimates, 600 million jobs need to be created in the next 15 years just to maintain current employment rates.
The most striking feature of the report, I think, is that it takes into account the diversity of conditions prevailing in each country regarding economic development and the labor market. The World Bank identified eight categories of countries according to these conditions and explained how the nature of “good jobs” -- in other words, proper growth and employment strategies -- differs in each of them. To give you an idea of this diversity, I would like to note that a growth-employment strategy in an “agrarian economy” should not be similar to that of an “aging society.”
versus high employment
During these two press conferences, I focused my comments on four questions that constitute passionately debated subjects in Turkey: first, how increases in productivity versus employment must be balanced in terms of growth; second, how to integrate members of the youth population who are not working, studying or looking for a job into the labor market; third, what should be done with the existing stock of poorly educated, unskilled people; and fourth, how to address the issue of an aging population.

The issues of idle youth and the aging population have been discussed recently in this column. So, allow me this time to focus on the first issue I addressed at the press conferences. In the period preceding the global recession, which was characterized by high growth (roughly 6 percent per year), most economists and the press in Turkey bemoaned the “jobless growth,” asserting that although the growth was there, it was not creating enough jobs. Indeed, if one considers the increase in total employment, limited to approximately to 2 percent per year on average, the capacity of that capacity of growth to create jobs was rather limited.
I had two objections to this assertion, however. First, this economic growth was in fact creating enough jobs in non-agricultural sectors as this type of employment increased approximately 3 percent between 2003 and 2008. Secondly, this outcome cannot be considered a valid point of complaint for three basic reasons: The unemployment rate was kept around 10 percent, the high growth allowed for the move of people from poorly productive agricultural jobs into productive non-agricultural jobs and the value added workers increased rapidly, pushing up wages and overall per capita income.
In the aftermath of the global recession, not only did very high growth prevail -- on average around 9 percent in 2010 and 2011 -- but it started to create a lot of jobs -- maybe too many! Indeed, the yearly increase in employment reached 6 percent in this period, significantly pushing up the capacity of growth to create jobs. Even in 2012, when growth decelerated tremendously, the increase in employment continued. One should note that this strong increase in employment in recent years is partly due to a surprising increase in agricultural jobs, with much of the remaining job creation happening in the service sector.
So, we are no longer hearing the complaint about “jobless growth,” but should we happy about that? I am not sure. It is true that the unemployment rate has decreased by about one percentage point over the pre-crisis period and that labor force participation has increased. However, the increase worker productivity has decelerated significantly, to the point of nearly stagnating in the past year. Admittedly, the ideal situation for growth with regards to the productivity-employment balance would be one that is based mostly on productivity gains while at the same time allowing unemployment to decrease slightly. However, this is easier said than done.