recession etiketine sahip kayıtlar gösteriliyor. Tüm kayıtları göster
recession etiketine sahip kayıtlar gösteriliyor. Tüm kayıtları göster

1 Şubat 2014 Cumartesi

Fears of recession and contagion

While I was surfing the Internet this morning (Friday), trying to get recent information and the latest on economic events before discussing the probable consequences of the recent tightening of Turkish monetary policy, I discovered a column written by Paul Krugman, the Nobel Prize-winning American economist, titled “Talking Troubled Turkey.” Krugman seems quite concerned about the current state of the Turkish economy.
Paul Krugman concerned by Turkish economy
He argues that in case of “a sudden stop,” i.e., a stop in short-term capital inflows from abroad, a recession cannot be avoided in Turkey. Then the contagion risk to other weak countries would be very serious, given the weaknesses of Western economies that make “these troubles scary.” Finally, the whole world economy might end up in a mess triggered by a Turkish crisis, as happened at the end of the 1990s in East Asia and in the recent past in Europe because of troubled Greece.
Krugman is right. In the case of a sudden stop, the Turkish economy could go into a recession caused by a continuous depreciation of the Turkish lira. As for the contagion, I will leave it to you to agree or not with Professor Krugman, who has more authority than I do on the matter. So, the critical question is, does the risk of a sudden stop remain, despite the interest rate increases decided by the Turkish Central Bank on Tuesday evening?
Before trying to answer this critical question, I would like to reiterate, once again, that without this decision a recession was absolutely certain. I have already explained the reasons many times in this column. I do not want to exhaust my limited space repeating them, but will just mention the statement of Murat Ülker, chairman of Yıldız Holding, which owns food manufacturer Ülker. Ülker is also a person who is very close to our prime minister. On Thursday, Mr. Ülker declared, “I would have never thought that I would be waiting for the interest rate decision and be happy to see an increase.”
Since Wednesday, the USD-Turkish lira parity has gone below 2.30 while it was pushing 2.40 before the dramatic interest rate decision. But the exchange rate is still very volatile and there is no clear signal regarding a trend of appreciation. Since Dec. 17, the date the probe scandal became public, the Turkish lira lost 12 percent of its value. This loss must be added to the loss of 8 percent that occurred since last June. Thus, the overall depreciation of the local currency reached 20 percent. Even if the current level of the exchange rate, say at around 2.26, is maintained in the coming weeks, disastrous consequences for the economy cannot be avoided. The balance sheets of the Turkish companies having high debt denominated in hard currencies will be dramatically deteriorated. This is very bad news for investment.
Furthermore, the inflation forecast of the central bank, recently revised from 5.3 percent to 6.6 percent, will still be out of reach, since the pass-through from import prices to inflation will be much higher than what the central bank assumed when making its new forecast. This means that the actual level of the central bank policy rate at 10 percent would not be enough to encourage capital inflows, in other words, to avoid a sudden stop. At first glance, the recent interest rate increase seemed to be quite harsh and thus sufficient to revive the appetite for assets denominated in the Turkish lira. In fact, the interest rate increase has not been that harsh. The bottom line of the story is that the cost of the liquidity given by the central bank rose from 7.75 percent to 10 percent. This new level of the basic interest rate pushed up the expected real interest rate from zero to 2 percent, since the inflation expectation in the last survey is close to 8 percent. Nevertheless, the expectations may rapidly worsen if the Turkish lira does not appreciate to some extent in the near future.
Admittedly, political uncertainties as well as the discourse of the prime minister about the place of the interest rate in an open market economy, a discourse that defies the basics of economic theory, caused significant damage in terms of confidence with respect to economic governance. The central bank cannot reverse the threats the Turkish economy is facing alone. A few days ago, government officials started talking about Plans B and C, Plan A probably being the recent move by the central bank. We don't have enough details to comment on these later plans, but it seems that new rules about corruption are envisaged as well as incentives for foreign capital. We'll see. In the meantime, Turkey will continue to give Mr. Krugman some shivers.

25 Haziran 2013 Salı

The ‘sudden stop' threat

While I asked in this column on Saturday if the “Turkish economy is on the eve of a recession,” Professor Daron Acemoğlu from MIT was speaking the same day at Bilgi University about the risk of a “sudden stop” in the Turkish economy.


Turkish Central Bank became prisoner of the intereset rate lobby discourse 
A hot debate is open. Let's first briefly explain the “sudden stop” for readers unfamiliar with the concept. In an economy where capital movements are free, short-term investments and capital inflows can change direction and leave the recipient country very quickly from time to time. The reversal of capital flows depends basically on an eventual risk of capital losses due to a decrease in asset prices. When this eventuality is perceived by the majority of investors, they simply take home their money.
A number of factors can cause such behavior, and there is no need to invent an “interest lobby” to explain the sudden stop phenomenon. For a foreign investor who exchanged some amount of dollars into Turkish lira and invested it in Turkish-lira denominated assets, the value of the Turkish lira becomes a decisive parameter. If the majority of investors start expecting an imminent depreciation of the local currency, it is quite rational for them to sell their assets before this depreciation occurs. And when sales begin, asset prices start decreasing.
Economists call this a “self-fulfilling prophecy.” Of course the risks and consequences of the sudden stop vary from one economy to another. The lower local interest rates are compared with the expected interest rates of safe assets like American Treasury bonds or Eurobonds, the higher the risk of a sudden stop. The larger the current account deficit in an economy and the more over-financed it is by short-term capital flows, the more likely this economy is to face a sudden stop. And last but not least, the weaker investors' confidence in economic management, the more they are inclined to perceive increasing risks of a sudden stop. Here, we are coming back to the self-fulfilling prophecy.
Two out of these three conditions have been present in the Turkish economy since one month ago, roughly. Turkish Lira had appreciated more than what the Central Bank was ready to accept for macroprudential reasons. So it lowered interest rates, aiming to provoke a controlled depreciation of the Turkish lira. The interest rates went so low that expected real interest rates became negative, launching a debate about their sustainability. This debate is fully justified because Turkey still carries one of the highest current account deficits in the world. Moreover, this deficit is mostly financed by short-term capital flows. In this context came Bernanke's statement regarding an eventual tightening of the FED's monetary policy in the future if the US economy continues its recovery. Then US Treasury bonds' interest rates increased slightly.
So, most of the ingredients for the sudden stop that started last week were already present in the Turkish economy. As for the investor confidence issue, we can't yet say that it has definitely started weakening. Nevertheless, we should admit that our governors have done all they can in this respect. Accusing an obscure interest lobby of provoking a sudden stop and a rapid deprecation of the Turkish lira as well as a rapid increase of market interest rates is certainly not the right approach to calm down already nervous investors. This is because it reveals an absolutely wrong reading of the events that are happening and at the same time increases worries about the government's ability to properly manage an open market economy suffering from some fragilities.
What is most dangerous, I think, in this approach is that it takes the Central Bank's monetary policy prisoner. At the moment, the Central Bank prefers to use its hard currency reserves to end the sudden stop, hoping that outside and inside Turkey there will soon be enough good news to reverse current adverse expectations. However, it may be obliged to use its interest rate weapon, since its reserves are rather limited. If this need appears, it will be not easy for the Turkish Central Bank's management, albeit independent by law, to pull out the interest rate weapon since the government firmly condemns high interest rates as the mother of all badness.
To end this article, let me recall the infamous battle former Prime Minister Tansu Çiller waged against market interest rates in November 1993, triggering a full-fledged financial crisis. The Turkish economy today is far more structurally strong than it was in the 1990s and a financial crisis is not likely. But a recession is possible.