Electoral threshold becomes a critical issue

This is my third article on the electoral threshold issue. Some readers may find my insistence boring. I will try to convince them that they are mistaken.
What does make Mr. Erdoğan so worrying?  Last weekend, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared in his speech at the opening ceremony of Şırnak Şerafettin Elçi Airport -- and by the way, it was a courageous decision and an important political gesture to name this new airport in the Southeast for the late Şerafettin Elçi, who was a great defender of the Kurdish cause -- that the 10 percent electoral threshold will be maintained. I said in my previous column: “I am impatient to see the AK Party's final decision regarding the electoral threshold.” I've got my answer in spades. Thank you, Mr. Erdoğan. The prime minister defended this extremely important decision with the following arguments: “Our view with regard to the election threshold is this: In systems where there are no election thresholds, you do not find confidence and stability. Over the past decade, we have obtained stability and confidence in our country, which were possible thanks to a government structure without coalitions. We cannot ignore this. … We don't want to ruin the performance of our country.” I do not agree with these arguments. It is true that Turkey lost the 1990s because of inconsistent and unstable coalition governments. Nevertheless, there is actually no danger of coalitions, considering the high support that exists for the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Even in the worst case scenario, in the next general elections it can easily obtain over 40 percent of the vote. A comparison of the current electoral system with the suggested new one based on a lower threshold and narrowed constituencies shows that the reformed system serves the AK Party's interests better as long as the AK Party's share of the vote does not go below 40 percent. So, why is there such a fear of a low threshold? As I explained, Mr. Erdoğan does not want to take the risk of losing some of the AK Party's electors who might decide to vote for the Felicity Party (SP) and the Democrat Party (DP) if there is a lower threshold. Even the threshold of 7 percent that has been considered among AK Party management was not enough to appease the fears of Mr. Erdoğan. However, the prime minister does not seem to have abandoned the idea of narrowing the constituencies. If the electoral system reform is limited to narrowed constituencies without touching the 10 percent threshold, the electoral system will become more unfair and more advantageous to the incumbent party and at the same time, less defensible. Indeed, maintaining the threshold at 10 percent can prevent loss of electors to the SP and DP, but this will also prevent the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) from entering Parliament. This time, I am impatient to hear what the AK Party will say to the BDP. One can still suggest that they present independent candidates as they already have. But in that case, the BDP will still be unable to benefit from the public funds accorded to parties. Or, one can suggest, as was insinuated by the prime minister some time ago, that “they must work harder” to get more than 10 percent. However, the AK Party has not forgotten that any increase of electoral support for the BDP will be at its own expense. I believe that the AK Party took a serious risk regarding the settlement process by deciding to maintain the electoral threshold at 10 percent. I am still unable to fully understand the AK Party's goals. I think the AK Party is trying to guarantee having a referendum majority (330 + seats) in the next general elections, which will be held in May 2015. This is the only way or hope for Mr. Erdoğan to institute a presidential system and most probably be elected president of the republic next year. So, he needs every single vote. The simulations I presented in a report last February [Bahçeşehir University Center for Economic and Social Research (BETAM)] prove that in an election with narrowed constituencies, the AK Party is able to reach the referendum majority of over 46 percent, but it needs at least 50 percent under the existing system simply because the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) will be the only loser, assuming that the BDP will not meet the 10 percent threshold because of independent candidates. Narrowing the constituencies cannot be detrimental for the BDP, thanks to the concentration of its electors in a small number of constituencies. This could be the reason why Mr. Erdoğan has decided to take large risks regarding the settlement process.

Electoral threshold is key for AK Party vote support

The headline of my column on Tuesday asked “Why does AK Party fear lowering electoral threshold?” Before I gave my suggested answer to this question, I explained how the excessively high electoral threshold of 10 percent is not only unacceptable from the point of view of fair representation, but at the same time detrimental to the settlement process regarding the Kurdish problem.
I cannot believe that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government would be willing to confront the political risks of maintaining the threshold at 10 percent, despite some declarations from AK Party managers insinuating that maintaining it is among the options being considered. Still, according to those declarations, hopefully lowering the threshold to 7 percent is also on the table.  Edoğan fears to loose electors by lowering the thershold Obviously, the AK Party is facing a difficult choice regarding the electoral threshold. But why? I do not think that the intention of the AK Party is to continue preventing the Kurdish Party (actually the Peace and Democracy Party [BDP]) from entering Parliament under its party label instead of presenting independent candidates, as is the case actually. I was quite explicit in my last article, referring to the results of my work on an electoral system reform, on some apparent paradoxes. I asserted in this work that even if the threshold is reduced, if this reduction is combined with narrowing electoral constituencies in such a way that the biggest ones will be limited to six seats, the number of AK Party deputies for the same vote distribution would be higher in this new electoral system than in the current one but with a critical condition: the AK Party vote's share must be higher than 40 percent. Voter intention surveys are regularly published in the press by a number of survey centers. Up until now I have not seen any of them suggesting that intended votes for the AK Party might be below 40 percent. In fact, AK Party electoral support still appears to be quite far from this fateful threshold. So why is the AK Party hesitating to make a radical electoral reform? Lowering the threshold but still maintaining it at a relatively high level, like 7 percent, does not seem, at first glance, meaningful. A 7 percent threshold, compared with the intended votes for the BDP varying around 6.5 percent, is playable for this party. The BDP may accept this challenge since some electoral analysts -- Tarhan Erdem, the chief executive officer of the Konda research center, for example -- believe that the BDP can easily receive more than 7 percent. This is also my opinion. If the threshold is lowered to 7 percent, some angry Kurdish voters of the AK Party can vote for the BDP along with the dissatisfied Turkish electors of the AK Party who are not at all happy with the hesitations of the AK Party concerning democratic reforms. Then what could be the fear that might explain the AK Party's hesitations regarding lowering the electoral threshold? I think that the explanation must be searched for in the AK Party's electoral base. It is well-known that the AK Party has very heteroclite voters constituted mainly by voters sensitive to political Islam, Turkish nationalism and the traditional center right, to enumerate the main streams. The number of independent electors who vote for the AK Party simply because they believe that it is the best party available at the moment should be added to this coalition. The traditional party of political Islam, represented actually by the Felicity Party (SP), as well as the party representing the traditional center right, the Democrat Party (DP), have in fact been marginalized because of the high electoral threshold that pushed important voters close to these two historic political movements to vote for the AK Party strategically. We can also say that for those electors, voting for the AK Party is the second best option. Indeed, voting for the SP or the DP means voting indirectly for the opposition since the SP and the DP cannot get enough votes to enter Parliament. I think that if the threshold is canceled or lowered to quite a low level, the share of votes of the SP and the DP might be easily and sizably increased at the expense of AK Party votes. I think that the AK Party cannot simply support this eventuality. I am impatient to see the AK Party's final decision regarding the electoral threshold.