I cannot believe that
the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government would be willing to
confront the political risks of maintaining the threshold at 10 percent,
despite some declarations from AK Party managers insinuating that maintaining
it is among the options being considered. Still, according to those
declarations, hopefully lowering the threshold to 7 percent is also on the
table.
|
Edoğan fears to loose electors by lowering the thershold |
Obviously, the AK
Party is facing a difficult choice regarding the electoral threshold. But
why? I do not think that the intention of the AK Party is to continue
preventing the Kurdish Party (actually the Peace and Democracy Party [BDP])
from entering Parliament under its party label instead of presenting
independent candidates, as is the case actually. I was quite explicit in my
last article, referring to the results of my work on an electoral system
reform, on some apparent paradoxes. I asserted in this work that even if the
threshold is reduced, if this reduction is combined with narrowing electoral
constituencies in such a way that the biggest ones will be limited to six
seats, the number of AK Party deputies for the same vote distribution would
be higher in this new electoral system than in the current one but with a
critical condition: the AK Party vote's share must be higher than 40 percent.
Voter intention
surveys are regularly published in the press by a number of survey centers.
Up until now I have not seen any of them suggesting that intended votes for
the AK Party might be below 40 percent. In fact, AK Party electoral support
still appears to be quite far from this fateful threshold. So why is the AK
Party hesitating to make a radical electoral reform? Lowering the threshold
but still maintaining it at a relatively high level, like 7 percent, does not
seem, at first glance, meaningful. A 7 percent threshold, compared with the
intended votes for the BDP varying around 6.5 percent, is playable for this
party. The BDP may accept this challenge since some electoral analysts --
Tarhan Erdem, the chief executive officer of the Konda research center, for
example -- believe that the BDP can easily receive more than 7 percent. This
is also my opinion. If the threshold is lowered to 7 percent, some angry
Kurdish voters of the AK Party can vote for the BDP along with the
dissatisfied Turkish electors of the AK Party who are not at all happy with
the hesitations of the AK Party concerning democratic reforms.
Then what could be the
fear that might explain the AK Party's hesitations regarding lowering the
electoral threshold? I think that the explanation must be searched for in the
AK Party's electoral base. It is well-known that the AK Party has very
heteroclite voters constituted mainly by voters sensitive to political Islam,
Turkish nationalism and the traditional center right, to enumerate the main
streams. The number of independent electors who vote for the AK Party simply
because they believe that it is the best party available at the moment should
be added to this coalition. The traditional party of political Islam,
represented actually by the Felicity Party (SP), as well as the party
representing the traditional center right, the Democrat Party (DP), have in
fact been marginalized because of the high electoral threshold that pushed
important voters close to these two historic political movements to vote for
the AK Party strategically. We can also say that for those electors, voting
for the AK Party is the second best option. Indeed, voting for the SP or the
DP means voting indirectly for the opposition since the SP and the DP cannot
get enough votes to enter Parliament.
I think that if the
threshold is canceled or lowered to quite a low level, the share of votes of
the SP and the DP might be easily and sizably increased at the expense of AK
Party votes. I think that the AK Party cannot simply support this
eventuality. I am impatient to see the AK Party's final decision regarding
the electoral threshold.
|
Hiç yorum yok:
Yorum Gönder