Elections etiketine sahip kayıtlar gösteriliyor. Tüm kayıtları göster
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23 Haziran 2014 Pazartesi

The new political game

In my Monday column (“Opposition candidate can win”), written just before the announcement of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu as the opposition's joint candidate, I argued that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan can be challenged and possibly defeated in the election for president of the republic only if the two main opposition parties, the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), present a common candidate who will be able to garner the votes of some supporters of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The largest majority of the opposition now has such a candidate.

Mr. İhsanoğlu is not only a good candidate for Çankaya as respects his personal attributes, but also his candidacy makes it possible to change the political game in Turkey. The former head of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Professor İhsanoğlu is known as a prominent expert on Ottoman history in academic circles. His attitude toward the Turkish republican tradition and secularism clearly shows that he cannot be considered a politician who belongs to political Islam. When speaking to the Cumhuriyet daily on Tuesday, İhsanoğlu said he was upset by criticism claiming that he is against secularism and bears hostile feelings toward Atatürk. “I feel very sad when I hear such assessments. Rejecting Atatürk and the reality of the republic and its gains would be a huge mistake,” he said.

İhsanoğlu must be seen as subscribing to the Ottoman tradition of the Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası (Freedom and Accord Party), whose political line was, by the beginning of the 20th century, based on a constitutional democracy and on the conciliation of Islamic values with individual liberties. This party constituted the backbone of the opposition against the İttihad ve Terakki Fırkası (Party of Union and Progress), which represented Turkish nationalism and positivism with Jacobin practices in the political fight. This main political fault line has been around during the republican era; the CHP represents the Union and Progress tradition, while various center-right parties represent the opposite tradition, starting with the Terakki Perver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republican Party), which was banned and closed down by the CHP government in 1925.

So, one should not be surprised by the fact that İhsanoğlu's candidacy provoked furious debates within the CHP. The Kemalist wing of the party, representing the Union and Progress tradition today, strongly opposes the choice of İhsanoğlu, and claims that it has been betrayed by the chairman of the CHP. At the same time, this risky choice for CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu should be considered a major move aimed not only at seriously challenging Mr. Erdoğan and his presidential ambitions but, at the same time, opening the way for a reconciliation between the two historical political traditions that may enlarge the entrenched electorate of the CHP through possibly attracting the support of conservatives. Nevertheless, this opening may also provoke the departure of Kemalists from the party. The result of the election will be a crucial turning point since it could drastically change the course of Turkish politics. If Mr. Erdoğan wins, Turkey will experience a de facto presidential regime, which is likely to deepen the existing political fractures and finally destabilize Turkey. If Mr. İhsanoğlu wins, not only will an actual authoritarian drift be stopped but, at the same time, the chance to make a new democratic Constitution based on a compromise will be increased.

Can Mr. İhsanoğlu win the election? Yes, but this depends on the answers to three critical questions. No doubt, İhsanoğlu will gather the support of a very large majority of the MHP electorate, and those of the two small Islamic-rightist parties, the Grand Unity Party (BBP) and the Felicity Party (SP). This support will guarantee him a vote share of above 20 percent. The critical question is what will be the voting behavior of the CHP electorate, which constitutes about 25 percent of the total electorate. If an important part of them – say, for example, 30-40 percent -- decide to boycott the ballot box and if İhsanoğlu is not able to bite into the AKP's electorate, Mr. Erdoğan may win right at the first round. So, this is the second critical question. However, I believe İhsanoğlu is probably the best candidate able to get the support of some non-core AKP electors.

I think if the share of CHP voters refusing to make a choice between Erdoğan and İhsanoğlu remains rather limited, and if İhsanoğlu succeeds in winning over even a modest part of the AKP electorate, the winner will be decided in the second round. Here, we come to the third critical question. What will the attitude of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party/Peoples' Democratic Party (BDP/HDP) -- presenting its own candidate in the first round -- be in the second round? It is up to İhsanoğlu to convince this party that he will not be an obstacle to a democratic solution of the Kurdish problem. 

15 Mart 2014 Cumartesi

What can we expect from an elected president?

In my column on Feb. 14, I suggested two possibilities of the evolution of the political situation after the local elections to be held on March 30.
President Gül & PM Erdoğan
Depending on the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) share of votes, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will either take on the risk of a presidential regime saga, or he will choose to maintain the existing presidential regime and retain his title of prime minister. I argued that Mr. Erdoğan would not want to become a president with limited executive powers, as is the case at present. Thus, his decision will depend on the possibility of winning a referendum majority (more than 330 seats) in the general elections that will follow the presidential election. Indeed, the only possibility of transforming the current parliamentary system into a presidential one is to secure a referendum majority in Parliament, which will allow the AKP to change the constitution. I claimed that if this possibility is perceived as being quite risky, Abdullah Gül, the current president of the republic, will be the AKP candidate in the presidential election.
Recent events have made the second scenario more plausible. Indeed, the signs being given by AKP spokespeople, including Mr. Erdoğan himself, show that a repeal of the three-term limit which prevents Mr. Erdoğan from ruling for a fourth term is definitely on the AKP's agenda. This three-term limit has been a party rule for a long time, and Mr. Erdoğan has always defended this rule with passion. So, why this sudden U-turn? I think the AKP is expecting a share of votes below the critical threshold of 45 percent despite the optimistic declarations of its managers.
I have already explained why 45 percent constitutes a critical threshold with respect to Erdoğan's decision on the presidency, but let me reiterate it briefly. If it obtains less than 45 percent of the vote, the AKP is unable to gain the referendum majority, even if it changes the electoral system by narrowing the constituencies as has been suggested by the prime minister. I think the presidential ambitions of Mr. Erdoğan seem to be over. If this is the case, and we will learn this very soon, the AKP needs another candidate for the presidential election, which will be held for the first time by popular vote. It has no other alternative than Gül, the co-founder of the AKP along with Erdoğan and the president of the republic. If Gül is elected, and it is almost certain that he will at least go through to the second round, a new era in Turkish politics as well as in the internal balances of the AKP will open up.
Indeed, the powers of the president of the republic were designed in the existing constitution by the military rulers of the 1980 military coup in such a way that Gen. Kenan Evren, who led the coup, would be able to control the elected civil governments after he gave up his uniform and became president of the republic. These powers include, besides the standard power of veto of the laws voted by Parliament, the right to nominate a number of high bureaucrats in state organs, including those in the high judiciary. Moreover, the president of the republic has the right to lead the government's meetings.
President Gül refrained from using this last right during his mandate as Mr. Erdoğan has been the uncontested leader of the executive power. But things may change when the president is elected by the people. Two factors allow me to believe that Mr. Gül would behave differently during his second mandate. The first factor is related to the fact that Mr. Gül as a candidate running for an election is obliged to present a program and make some promises. Since these programs and promises cannot be about the governance of the country, which remains the exclusivity of the government, they can only be about safeguarding freedoms and the rule of law and increasing democracy. Candidate Gül must proclaim how and which goals he will use his rather extensive powers for.
The second factor is the fact that a president elected by the people will give the president of the republic greater moral weight and legitimacy in the balance of power within the executive and more specifically within the AKP. The existence of a president elected by the people and having rather great powers was criticized as an unsustainable regime since it encompasses two heads of the executive power. I agree. But for the time being I hope the elected president will constitute a minimal system of checks and balances against a prime minister who is not afraid of breaking the law.

25 Mayıs 2013 Cumartesi

What strategy could be better for the AK Party?

Recent debates on different scenarios regarding the timing of the upcoming elections prove that Turkey has already entered into the long-lasting, painful electoral period. Three elections and a referendum are on the agenda. The dates of two out of three of the elections are fixed: Local elections will be held in March of 2014 and the election for the president of the republic will be in August of 2014.


Risks of insistence on presidential system
General elections are forecast to be held in June of 2015, but they may be held earlier; this is up to the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) since it has the majority in Parliament. The date of a possible referendum on the new constitution is unknown at the moment.
The schedule of these elections is critical, concerning political outcomes as well as the pace of the Turkish economy. The game maker is obviously the AK Party. Its goals and its maneuvering capabilities will determine the schedule. The goals are quite clear: The AK Party wants a new constitution in which a presidential or semi-presidential regime will be integrated. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wants to be elected president of a presidential regime, and preferably in the first round, supported by a comfortable majority. Furthermore, the AK Party, as the incumbent party, wants to win the coming general elections with a number of seats exceeding 330 -- the majority required to bring the new constitution to referendum -- in case it is not possible to hold a referendum before the general elections.
Here are too many, and quite ambitious, goals. How about the maneuvering capabilities? The way is very narrow and there are unwelcome constraints. First of all, the AK Party does not possess the 330 seats it needs; it lacks only a few of them, but since the voting on constitutional changes is confidential, it can never be positive it has secured the support of all of its deputies. The additional votes to support its constitutional proposal can be provided only by the deputies of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and possibly by some deputies of the Republican People's Party (CHP) that belong to its social democratic faction.
So, the AK Party must look for compromises with those deputies. The problem is that they are firmly opposed to the presidential regime, at least as it is suggested by the AK Party. It is clear that the AK Party must give up its presidential regime goal if it desires to have a new constitution before the presidential election, and even before local elections. Indeed, the success of the settlement process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and with the BDP depends on the democratic reforms in the electoral system, the laws regarding political parties, the judiciary system and, last but not least, the Constitution. The constitutional reform cannot be done without the support of the BDP. On the other hand, the success of the settlement process is vital for the electoral success of the AK Party in the coming elections.
Another factor that is not vital but very important for the electoral success of the ruling party is the attitude of voters who support the AK Party based on its management of the economy.      Now, the economy is not doing well. Signs of a “middle income trap” are increasing for Turkey. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth is under 3 percent. The unemployment rate has not yet shown an alarming rise, but this is because of the extent of negative labor productivity gains during the last few quarters. As a result, the income per capita has started to stagnate. The main reason for this stagnation is the postponement of difficult economic reforms because of possible political costs, precisely in deference to the coming elections.
Those difficult reforms could have caused vote losses for the AK Party, but if the economy continues to be trapped in a low-growth regime, the more time the elections take, the more the AK Party will risk losing electors.
Given these constraints, I think, the only rational strategy for the AK Party -- without giving up its goals and ambitions -- should be the following: Postpone ambitions for the presidency after the general elections. Successfully finish democratic reforms in collaboration with the BDP and the social democratic faction of CHP before local elections. The referendum can be held by the end of this year. Mr. Erdoğan will be able to be elected in August of next year and, I guess, it would be with a very large electoral support -- given the success of the peace process, which is capable of overshadowing increasing economic troubles.
Then, proceed to early elections in autumn 2014, in which a referendum majority for the AK Party is highly probable if, by then, the electoral system is reformed, canceling the 10 percent threshold. This also would require strongly downsizing the electoral districts at the same time. Doing so, the new AK Party government will be able to focus on economic reforms earlier, and this way it would gain valuable time for the Turkish economy and minimize the political risks it would face otherwise.