Housing prices in Turkey

Over the past months increasing rumors have circulated, as well as reports, about the worrying state of the housing industry. According to these rumors, too many houses were constructed over the past two years, when the Turkish economy was growing at “Asian Tiger” rates, although now real estate developers will have difficulty selling off their stocks. Unfortunately, there are no direct statistics informing us about supply and demand conditions in the Turkish housing market, but the evolution of housing prices can implicitly give useful information about these conditions. The Central Bank of Turkey has been publishing a monthly index of housing prices since January 2010. One cannot say that this new index has received the interest it deserves, either among newspaper editors or columnists, including myself. This data is collected in 73 provinces through the bank's expertise in the valuation of properties as subjects of housing loans. The index is available not just at the national level but also regionally, in relation to 26 regions. Different regional patterns observed in housing prices allow us to form views about the state of the economy in regions that can differ from the nationwide economic conjuncture for various reasons. Booming prices can be considered a signal of good economic health, while price moderation can give an indication to the contrary. From January 2010 to July 2012 -- the most recent statistics, released a few weeks ago -- the housing price index (HPI) increased by almost 28 percent. We can compare this increase with both the change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Producer Price Index (PPI) in order to get an idea about the real price increase in housing. Within two-and-a-half years, the CPI increased by 17 percent and the PPI by 22 percent. One can observe that a real price increase occurred in housing, since the HPI rose more than CPI as well as PPI. The substantial gap between CPI and HPI should also be noted. This gap can be considered evidence of strong demand in housing. Moreover, we do not observe any deceleration in HPI: From July 2010 to July 2011, HPI increased by 11 percent, and by almost the same rate from July 2011 to July 2012. Certainly these observations do not permit us to conclude that there are no selling problems in the housing market, but we can assert, with some caution of course, that there are no signs of recession. Having said this, it should be emphasized that the state of the housing market differs a lot from one region to the next, at least regarding the speed of the increase in these prices. Let's consider first the three big cities: İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Housing price indexes for İstanbul and İzmir are slightly higher than nationwide (127 and 126, respectively, against 124 for the national index). On the other hand, the Ankara index reached only 120 in July. It is interesting to observe that the Ankara index detached from the two others only in the last months. This could be the signal of a housing recession in the capital. I do not know if your curiosity runs along the same lines, but I should confess that when I discovered the regional figures I looked first at southeast Anatolia. The Gaziantep-Kilis-Adıyaman region is the champion in housing inflation, with HPI reaching 157. Diyarbakır-Şanlıurfa follows with 144. As for Batman-Mardin-Siirt-Şırnak, the HPI, at 125, is perfectly in line with the countrywide index. However, Van-Bitlis-Hakkari-Muş has by far the lowest HPI with 104. One can say that housing prices have almost stagnated during the last two-and-a-half years in this region. How to explain these huge differences? Terrorism and armed clashes ravaging the Southeast are not very helpful as an explanation since they are widely spread over the whole region, albeit they might be more intense in Van-Hakkari. Another possible explanation could be the differentiated economic development in the Southeast. Indeed, we know that in Gaziantep as well as in Diyarbakır-Şanlıurfa employment has increased remarkably in recent years, while in the Van-Hakkari region we have witnessed contrary changes (see the research note of the Bahçeşehir University Center for Economic and Social Research [BETAM] titled “Regional Unemployment”). These observations can be considered evidence of highly differentiated economic development in the Southeast, and this differentiation might explain the highly uneven evolution of housing prices in this region. We have the habit in Turkey of considering the Southeast a homogenous entity where poverty is widely spread. It might be time to reconsider these prejudgments, at least for some parts of this region.

İşsizlikte dönüm noktası

Pazartesi günü TÜİK her ayın 15’inde yaptığı gibi işgücü piyasası istatistiklerini açıkladı. Yıllardır bu piyasayı yakından takip etmeye çalışıyorum. Rakamları büyük bir engel yoksa açıklandıkları gün incelerim. Çoğu zaman eğilimler bellidir. İşsizlik artmakta ya da düşmektedir. Eğilimin değişmesini beklemiyorsam yeni rakamları fazla merak etmem. Buna karşılık işsizlikte eğilim değişikliğinin arifesinde olduğumuzu, diğer ifadeyle artışın yerini düşüşe bırakacağını ya da aksine düşen işsizliğin yeniden artışa geçeceğini bekliyorsam ayın 15’ini daha bir merakla beklerim.

            Bu ayın 15’i merakla beklediğim günlerdendi. Geçen ayki işgücü piyasası yazımda (“Büyüme-İstihdam paradoksu”, 19 Eylül Radikal) son 9 aydır istihdam artışının GSYH artışından daha yüksek olduğunun altını çizmiş ve bu anomalinin hizmet sektöründeki olağan dışı yüksek istihdam artışlarından kaynaklandığını belirtmiştim.  Yazıyı şöyle noktalamıştım: “Bu artışların sürekli olacağını sanmıyorum. Bir kaç dönem içinde düşük büyümenin istihdama yansıması gerekiyor.”

Düşük büyümenin etkisi

Beklediğim yansıma fazla gecikmedi. Ağustos döneminde Temmuza kıyasla toplam istihdam yüzde 0.4 oranında azalırken, işsizlik oranı da yüzde 8,9’dan 9,1’e yükseldi. Betam’ın (Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Araştırmalar Merkezi) bulguları da aynı yönde.  Pazartesi günü yayınladığı araştırma notunda (“İşsizlikte dönüm noktası”) Betam tarım dışı istihdamda Temmuz dönemine kıyasla 29 binlik bir kayıp, tarım dışı işgücünde ise 6 binlik bir artış tahmin ediyor. Sonuçta tarım dışı işsizlik oranı da genel işsizlik oranı gibi 0.2 puanlık artışla yüzde 11,2’den yüzde 11,4’e çıkıyor.

Kritik soru şu: Bundan böyle işsizlik artmaya devam edecek mi? Diğer ifadeyle Ağustos 2012 dönemi işsizliğin dip yaptığı dönem mi olacak? Benim kanaatim bu yönde. Elbette bir aylık gelişmeye, üstelik mevsim etkisinden arındırma işlemine dayanan bir tahmine bakarak bundan böyle işsizliğin muntazam artacağını söylemek zor. İstisnai olarak bazı dönemlerde işsizlikte bir azalma görsek de, büyüme yüzde 4’ün, hatta yüzde 5’in altında seyrettiği sürece istihdam artışı işgücü artışını karşılamaya yeterli olmayacaktır. Bu durumda işsizliğin artması kaçınılmazdır. Bu arada, Betam’ın 3. çeyrekte büyümenin biraz daha zayıfladığını tahmin ettiğini belirtmek isterim.

Seçim maratonu

Türkiye önümüzdeki yıldan itibaren zorlu bir seçim maratonuna giriyor. Büyümenin yetersiz kalması soncu işsizliğin artması seçimle gelen her hükümetin en son isteyeceği şeydir. Şimdilik Hükümet bu artışı görmezlikten geliyor. Geçen yıla kıyasla istihdamın arttığını, işsizliğin de düştüğünü öne sürüyor. Bu elbette doğru, ama işsizliğin sonbahara doğru artışa geçmiş olduğu iddiasını zayıflatmaz.

Mevsim etkisinden arındırılmış istatistiklerde işsizlik artışı devam ettiği takdirde Hükümet ister istemez tepki vermek zorunda kalacaktır. Bu tepkinin, son dönemin moda metaforuyla gaza basmak şeklinde olma ihtimali var.  Bu noktada şu sorulabilir: Gaza kim basacak? Merkez Bankası mı, Hükümet mi? Hükümet’in mali disiplinden kolay kolay taviz vereceğini sanmıyorum. Kamu harcamalarına belki bir seçimlik sınırlı ölçüde gaz verilir. Gaz verelim baskısı daha ziyade Merkez Bankası’na yönelecektir. Ama unutmayalım, gaza bir seçim için belki basabilirsiniz ama ard arda üç seçim  basamazsınız. Aksi takdirde virajı alamayıp arabayı devirmeniz çok muhtemeldir.

Turkey-EU relations need new perspective

Turkey-EU negotiations for membership are out of order since they started seven years ago. Now, regarding the results one can easily conclude that they are not impressive at all. Only 13 chapters have been opened out of a total of 33, while 10 are waiting for both sides to come to an agreement to them and 10 have been blocked by Cyprus. Negotiations, or rather the adoption of EU legislation, have only been concluded on the science and research chapter.
Who is responsible for this pitiful state of negotiations? For sure, there is more than one actor and the Cyprus presidency cannot be ranked first. That presidency will come to an end in two-and-a-half-months and even then the situation will not improve for the simple reason that negotiations were already at an impasse before Cyprus took over the EU presidency. First of all, it must be noted that the negotiations started on flawed ground. The negotiations for full membership began following the council meeting of December 2004 during which Turkey was declared “a candidate member”; however, at the same time Turkey was told that membership was not guaranteed even if the two sides managed to come to an agreement on all of the chapters. One can ask, of course, why Turkey accepted to negotiate under this condition. In other words, why would Turkey accept adopting the EU's rules and laws, particularly in areas, like competition, public procurement, environment, etc. where conflicts of interest are unavoidable as long as Turkey is not a full member of the EU? The answer to the question has never been given officially, but I can suggest two possible answers: First, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government that won the November 2002 elections with only 34 percent of the vote needed to absolutely consolidate its power, and the start of EU negotiations was considered an important tool in both preventing a very probable military intervention and for pushing economic growth. My second answer is that the AK Party, considering sincerely the EU membership as a strategic target for Turkey, thought that EU members opposed to Turkey's membership would change their minds, admitting that with time Turkey would become indispensable for Europe. It is likely that within these two possible answers lies the truth, but what does matter is that negotiations started and they contributed largely to the consolidation of the democratic regime as well as to its economic success, at least in the first phase. Then the opposition to Turkey's membership from the European side became more and more apparent and hurtful. Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy said on many occasions that Turkey will never enter the EU since “it is not a European country.” And in order to prove its determination, he blocked five chapters considered critical to full membership. As for German Chancellor Angela Merkel, she was perhaps less hurtful than Sarkozy, but not less opposed to Turkey's membership. France and Germany, not willing to risk irreversible damage to EU-Turkey relations, offered Turkey the status of a so-called “privileged partnership.” Turkey rejected it categorically since it was very difficult to see where the “privileges” lay. Last but not least, the Greek government of Cyprus, thinking that negotiations could be a good opportunity to pressure Turkey to recognize a single, Greek-dominated union government in Cyprus, decided to block, on its own, some additional chapters. While these negative attitudes were cooling the appetite of Turks for EU membership, the AK Party government was becoming more and more self confident as the economy was booming; exports were successfully being diversified towards the East and the risk of military coups was over. Has the AK Party started to think that EU membership is no more a strategically important target for Turkey? I am not sure, but it should be noted that signs indicating the government is leaning in this direction are increasing. Nevertheless, I have to remind you that the EU continues to be the main market for Turkish exports despite the recent decline due to the European recession. Turkey will crucially need the EU when the recession is over in order to continue its export-led growth. Also, Turkey continues to crucially need European investments, which constitute three-quarters of overall foreign direct investments (FDI). Moreover, I believe that EU membership continues to be a unique political anchor for Turkish democracy in its quest for stability and consolidation of power. Recently, Stefan Füle, the EU commissioner for enlargement, declared that Turkey and the EU “have many common interests and Turkey is a key country for the EU,” adding, “It is in our mutual interest that accession negotiations regain their momentum, notably also to allow the EU to remain the benchmark for Turkey's reforms.” I agree. But this momentum risks, sooner or later, being totally lost if a clear perspective of membership is not given. Turkey has no interest in fully adopting the EU legislation and policies as long as full membership is not guaranteed. It should also be noted that such a perspective would largely facilitate a negotiated solution in Cyprus, which I believe is the main political obstacle to the membership.

Is the new roadmap credible?

Roadmaps for the economy are one thing; making the economy conform to these roadmaps is another. Let's consider the last roadmap for the Turkish economy. I mean by this the Medium-term Economic Program (OVP) delivered each year in October and covering the three years ahead. In the first part of this document, the government announces the main macroeconomic targets, like gross domestic product (GDP) growth, inflation, unemployment, current account balance and budget deficit. In the second part, the policies to be followed are outlined as well as the reforms to be implemented, in order to achieve those targets. In last year's OVP, growth and inflation rates for 2012 were forecast at 4 percent and 5.2 percent, respectively, while the unemployment rate was forecast at 10.4 percent and current account deficit (CAD) ratio to GDP minus 8 percent. Given these parameters, the government had planned to maintain the budget deficit at 1.5 percent for 2012.
The year is not yet over, but the main macroeconomic indicators are already visible. Regarding growth and inflation as well as budget deficit, the targets will not be reached. The OVP of this year, published on Tuesday, recognizes this failure. Indeed, the new OVP forecasts GDP growth and inflation at 3.2 percent and 7.4 percent, respectively. The growth is lower, inflation is higher than predicted and the budget deficit will reach 2.3 percent instead of 1.5 percent due to lower growth. However, there has also been some happy eluding of targets; for example the CAD ratio will be lower than expected at 7.4 percent. Admittedly a better result, but do not forget that this achievement is a natural consequence of lower growth; less production means less importation. Another pleasant surprise appears in unemployment, which decreased to 9 percent despite the low growth. We have here a small miracle that is very rare in economics. How has it been possible? What we know for the moment is that employment in the service sector increased much more than the value added during the past months. I believe that this is an exceptional and transitory situation, and I expect very soon the start of an increasing trend in unemployment. These are the results of last year's roadmap. Could the new results be better? I do not think so. The government targets 4 percent growth next year, and 5 percent for 2014 and 2015. Several times in this column I have written that 5 percent is the estimated potential growth, so this is not an unrealistic target, but it is quite a challenging one. The challenge lies in the nature of the growth rather than in its size. Indeed, the government predicts that exports will continue to increase more than imports during the next three years. This means that domestic demand will be kept under control, the driving factor of the growth being exports. Assuming a better international economic environment, this export-led growth strategy could work if a rapid improvement in the competitiveness of the Turkish economy occurs. Given the fact that the new OVP does not foresee a depreciation of the Turkish lira, this strategy could be realized if structural reforms in the labor market as well as the energy sector are implemented without delay. Now, critical moves in the labor market like severance pay reform or fiscal devaluation (see my articles on these subjects in this column) are notable for their absence, while there are only a few vague promises regarding cost-cutting and productivity-enhancing reforms in the energy sector. I am afraid that once again we will be disappointed by the results of the new roadmap. If the growth rate continues to stay at low levels, neither budget deficit targets nor unemployment targets can be achieved. The planned budget deficit is 2.2 percent for 2013, slightly lower than this year's forecast. The task will be very hard since the expenditures should almost be stagnating in real terms, while tax revenues would be increasing accordingly to 4 percent growth. If growth is lower, the tax revenues will be lower, and the government would face a dilemma if it decided to stand behind its budget deficit target: It would be obliged to increase indirect taxes, as it did recently, or to decrease expenditures. I think neither of these things will be done in a year in which local elections are to be held. Obviously, the budget deficit will be higher than planned in this case. The other critical issue is, of course, unemployment. The OVP forecasts a slightly decreasing rate, from 9 percent to 8.7 percent in 2015. One could say that this is not very ambitious. I agree; however, I still have doubts as to its achievability. First, the labor force increase, implicitly assumed, is too low (1.9 percent), corresponding to an increase of 520,000 in the labor force. The tendency points to an increase of approximately 600,000. Second, the job creation capacity of the growth is assumed too high: For a 4 percent GDP growth, the OVP forecasts a 2.7 percent increase in non-agricultural employment. This growth-employment interaction does not leave enough space for productivity increases. This is certainly not the right way to achieve rather high growth that, moreover, must be based on exports.

Suriye sorunu pahalıya patlayabilir

Son günlerde savaş tamtamlarının sesleri daha çok duyulur oldu. Türkiye Suriye ile savaşa girer mi girmez mi kestirmek zor ama Güney komşumuz ile kriz sürdükçe ihracatımızın olumsuz etkilenme ihtimali de artıyor. Üstelik ihracatın Türkiye ekonomisinde hayati bir rol oynadığı sırada. Son bir yıldır büyümeyi ihracatın taşıdığı herkesin malumu. Bu durumun devam etmesi gerekiyor. Aksi takdirde, ya zaten yetersiz olan büyüme daha da düşer ya da iç talebi destekleyici politikalara geri döneriz. Böyle bir geri dönüş ise hafiflemekte olan cari açığın ateşini yeniden harlatır ve Türkiye ekonomisi er ya da geç piyasa düzeltmesine maruz kalır. Geçmiş deneyimlerimizden piyasanın elinin ağır olduğunu biliyoruz.

Suriye ile ticaret sıfırlanma yolunda

            Son yıllarda Türkiyeli ihracatçılar Avrupa dışındaki pazarlarda büyük hamleler gerçekleştirdiler. 2007’den 2011’e ihracatımız 107 milyar Dolardan 135 milyara yükselirken, Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika’nın payı yüzde 16’dan yüzde 23’e çıktı. Yekun olarak neredeyse ikiye katlanan bu ihracatta Suriye, İran, özellikle de Irak önemli rol oynadılar. Suriye’ye ihracat ne yazık ki sıfırlanmaya doğru gidiyor. 2007’de 800 milyon olan ihracat hacmi 2010’da 1 milyar 800 milyon ile tepe noktasına ulaşmıştı. Geçen yıl 1 milyar 600 milyona geriledi. Bu yıl ise baş aşağı gidiyor. Geçen yılın ilk sekiz ayında 1 milyar 160 milyon Dolar olan ihracat, çatışmaların sivil savaşa dönüşmesiyle bu yılın ilk sekiz ayında 360 milyona düştü.

            Bu düşüşün Güney Doğu ekonomisi üzerindeki yakıcı etkilerini bir kenara koyarsak, Suriye pazarının ihracatımızdaki mütevazı payı nedeniyle kale alınmayabileceği söylenebilir. Ancak İran ve Irak’a ihracat açısından durum farklı. 2011’in ilk sekiz ayında bu iki ülkeye yaklaşık 7,5 milyar Dolar ihracat yapmışız; toplam ihracat içindeki payları yüzde 9’a yakın. Bu yıl ise ilk sekiz ayda 15 milyar geçilmiş ve ihracatımızda İran-Irak payı yüzde 15’e yükselmiş. Gerçi bu sıçramada İran’ın altına yönelik iştahının unutulmamalı ama, 4-4,5 milyar dolarlık altın ihracatını göz ardı etsek bile, geriye yine de esaslı bir artış kalıyor.

Irak’a dikkat

            Suriye ile yaşanmakta olan kriz sıcak savaşa dönüşmese bile, krizin derinleşerek devam etme ihtimali az değil. Böyle bir durumda İran ve Irak ticareti olumsuz etkilenir mi? İran konusunda iyimser olabiliriz. Ambargo Doğu komşumuzun ekonomisine ciddi zarar vermeye başladı. Türkiye ABD’nin baskısıyla İran’dan aldığı petrolü azalttı ama doğal gaz ithalatı tam gaz devam ediyor. İran’ın pek çok malın arzını canlı tutabilmesi için Türk sanayi mallarına çok ihtiyacı var. Buna karşılık Irak’ın durumu farklı. Bu yılın ilk sekiz aynıda bu ülkeye 7 milyara yakın ihracat yapmışız. Aslında burada tek pazardan ziyade, Kuzey Irak ve esas Irak olmak üzere iki pazardan söz etmek gerekiyor. Kuzey Irak pazarına yapılan ihracat krizden etkilenmese bile esas Irak’a yapılan ihracat bir misillemenin kurbanı olabilir.

           

Bağdat ile son aylarda ilişkilerin gerginlikten açık husumete dönüştüğü malumunuz. Haşimi krizi yetmezmiş gibi bir de Suriye üzerinden Türkiye-İran çatışması çıktı. Maliki Hükümeti’nin bu çatışmada İran yanında saf tuttuğunu belirtmeme sanırım gerek yok. Bir süredir Bağdat Ankara’ya karşı dış ticaret silahını kullanabileceğinin sinyallerini veriyor. Suriye iç savaşı kısa sürede sona erdirilemezse, Irak ile ilişkilerimiz daha da kötüleşebilir ve ihracatımız ciddi zarar görebilir. Böyle bir durumda halen devam eden ekonomik dengeleme sürecinin sekteye uğrama ihtimali katiyen küçümsenmemeli.      

AK Party's 2023 vision

Last Sunday the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) held a congress that revealed two very different aspects of the ruling party: A very personalized leadership and, at the same time, a high capability for producing comprehensive reform agendas. I have been, like many others, very disappointed by the speech by the uncontestable leader of the AK Party, but I very much appreciated the reforms promised in the 70-page booklet called “Political Vision of the AK Party, 2023.” The speech of Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, admittedly very enthusiastic, was politically vague and empty regarding concrete policies and reforms. On the other hand, the vision for 2023 is full of important reform promises that are capable of improving and deepening our second-class democracy if, of course, they are implemented.
I am aware of the debate about the legitimacy or seriousness of the “Vision 2023” as a party document that was not discussed and voted on in the congress, but just distributed in the hall as an advertising brochure, but I do not care. The AK Party is certainly not a model of internal democracy and this is its way of producing policies, behind closed doors. But this does not mean that there is no debate. A written document signed by the ruling party should be considered seriously, and this is what I will do. Today I will focus my article particularly on the economic field, but let me make some comments about the political agenda. The democratization of the Political Parties Law with the aim “to further widen and free the political space” and radical changes in the Electoral Law for “better democratic representation” and for “allowing closer relations Between deputies and the people” would contribute efficiently to the normalization of the democratic regime. Having said that, let me remark that the two principles guiding the electoral system reform are quite in line with what I have suggested (see my article “Electoral System Reform,” Sept. 27) but the absence of the “electoral threshold issue” must be noted. I believe that the promise to remove the stipulations aimed at legitimizing military coups -- modern or post modern -- from all kind of official documents as well as the changes to courses in military schools in the direction of democratic values will be much more effective in the prevention of military interventions than the actual court cases. Last but not least, allowing the use of Kurdish when accessing public services, in courts, in hospitals, in schools etc., is a very encouraging step forward on the way to solving the Kurdish problem.    To be frank, the economic part of the “Vision 2023” did not fill me with enthusiasm as much as the political part did. The economic vision is very challenging without being eccentric. The 2023 targets are, admittedly, not easy to achieve, although they remain within the boundaries of realism. Good! My concern is not with targets, but with the absence of a concrete and consistent roadmap that would drive the Turkish economy toward these targets. Let's consider the basic macroeconomic vision. The AK Party, assuming of course that it will be in power until 2023, promises $2 trillion of GDP, $500 hundred billion of exports, $25,000 of income per capita, and a 5 percent unemployment rate. If the $2 trillion of GDP is reached, the export, per capita income and unemployment targets will follow. So the issue is how to climb to $2 trillion from, approximately, $760 billion of today's GDP? A simple growth calculation shows that the Turkish economy has to grow by a yearly average of 9 percent in dollar terms. Do not react at once saying, “My God, this can not be done.” Yes, it can be done. There will already be 3-4 percent guaranteed growth assuming a 2 percent dollar inflation and the 1-2 percent yearly appreciation of the Turkish lira in the long term originating from the “Balassa-Samuelson effect.” So, the Turkish economy needs at least a yearly average of 5 percent real GDP growth during the next decade. Moreover, the growth has to be based on exports rather than on domestic demand. If not the target of $500 billion in exports revenue can not be achieved and in the event of domestic-led growth, the 5 percent average growth rate cannot be achieved. So, an export-led growth is a must in order to have a GDP close to $2 trillion in 2023. So the basic difficulty is not with the growth speed, 5 percent being equal more or less to the estimated potential growth of the Turkish economy, but with the nature of the growth. In fact, we have had export-led growth for one year, exports growing more than imports, but the problem is that the growth rate evolves at around 3 percent instead of the required 5 percent. Then, the critical question is “how can the growth rate be raised from 3 to 5 percent without jeopardizing the current adjustment process?” The answer is, of course, not straight forward but its essence lays in the competitiveness of Turkish industry. So, the bottom line of the problem is how to rapidly improve the competitiveness of our industry. This is a gigantic task. Unfortunately we cannot count on the depreciation of the Turkish lira because we assume implicitly that there is no misalignment regarding the exchange rate. If not, the 9 percent growth rate in terms of the dollar cannot be achieved. Then, we will have to turn to lowering production costs and increasing productivity. Both of them demand radical structural reforms in the labor and energy markets, in the fiscal and education systems. Those reforms are crucially lacking in the “Vision 2023” of the AK Party.

Vizyonda ekonomik reformlar yok

Ak Parti genel başkanı Tayip Erdoğan’ın kongre konuşmasının duygusal ve hamaset yanının ağır bastığı, siyasal içerik açısından ise zayıf kaldığı konusunda çok geniş bir görüş birliği var.  Buna karşılık “Ak Parti 2023 Siyaset Vizyonu” başlıklı 70 sayfalık ‘manifesto’ iddialı hedefler ve kapsamlı reform önerileri içeriyor. Şahsen manifestoyu ciddiye alma taraftarıyım.

 Manifesto demokrasimizin  sağlamlaşması ve derinleşmesi bakımından çok önemli siyasal reformlar içeriyor. Siyasal partiler yasasının demokratikleştirilmesi, seçim sisteminde köklü değişiklikler yapılması, Kürtçe’nin savunmada ve kamu hizmetlerine erişimde kullanılabilmesi, darbe mevzuatının ilgası ile birlikte askeri okullarda eğitim mevzuatının demokrasi ilkeleri ışığında gözden geçirilmesi... Liste uzayıp gidiyor.

İddialı ekonomik hedefle

Siyasal reformlara sözüm yok. Bundan böyle bu vaatlerinin yakın takipçisi olacağız. Yeri geldikçe bu konularda topa girmeye de hevesliyim. Ancak ekonomi alanında manzara oldukça farklı. 2023’e yönelik bir dizi iddialı hedef var ama bu hedeflere ulaştıracak net ve tutarlı bir yol haritası yok. GSYH en az 2 trilyon dolara, ihracatımız 500 milyar dolara çıkacak, kişi başına gelir 25.000 dolara yükselecek, işsizlik oranı yüzde 5 düşerken, istihdam oranı en az yüzde 50’ye, kadınların işgücüne katılımı da yüzde 38’e çıkacak. Yoksu kalmayacak, kayıt dışılık yüzde 15’e geriletilecek

İyi güzel de bunlar nasıl gerçekleştirilecek? Hedefler afaki değiller, ama mevcut gidişatla da ulaşılabilir değiller. GSYH’dan başlayalım. Yıl sonu GSYH’nı 760 milyar dolar kabul edebiliriz. 2023’de 2 trilyon doları yakalamak için her yıl dolar bazında yüzde 9 büyümek gerekiyor. TL’nin mevcut değerini normal kabul edelim ve her yıl verimlilik artışı etkisinden kaynaklanacak 1 yüzde puan değerlenmeyi düşelim. Yüzde 8 büyüme ediyor. Yıllık yüzde 2 dolar enflasyonunu da düşelim, 2 trilyon için son tahlilde yüzde 6, bilemedin yüzde 5 reel büyüme gerektiği ortaya çıkıyor. 2 trilyona ulaşırsak, 500 milyar dolar ihracat ile kişi başı 25 bin dolar gerçekçi duruyor.

Tüm yollar yüzde 5 büyümeye çıkıyor

Ne yazık ki, böyle bir büyüme şimdilik ufukta gözükmüyor. Ama mümkün. “Nasıl derseniz?” yanıt hiç karmaşık değil. İhracata dayılı, yani ihracatın her yıl ithalattan daha hızlı arttığı bir büyüme rejimi gerekiyor. Yani bugünkü büyüme rejiminin 11 yıl daha devam etmesi gerekiyor. Oysa sorun herkesin malumu. Bugünkü büyüme istenilen nitelikte ama çok düşük: Yüzde 3 civarında. Bunu yüzde 5’e yükseltmemiz için sanayinin rekabet gücünü arttırmamız şart. Manifestoda buna dair sadece daha çok Ar-Ge ve daha fazla eğitim vaadi var. Bunlar gerekli ama yetmez. Mutlaka işgücü ve enerji piyasalarında maliyetleri düşürecek, verimliliği artıracak reformlar gerekiyor. Ama manifestoda bu reformlardan bahis yok.

İşgücü piyasası hedefleri için de aynı durum geçerli. İşsizliğin yüzde 5’e inmesi için yüzde en az yüzde 5 büyüme şart görünüyor. Biraz hesap yaptım. Yer olmadığından kestirmeden gideceğim. Mevcut eğilimler 2023’te işgücünün 36 milyona yükseleceğini gösteriyor. İşsizlik oranının yüzde 5 olması için istihdamın da yaklaşık 34 milyona yükselmesi gerekiyor. 25 milyondan 11 yılda 34 milyona çıkmak için gereken ortalama yıllık istihdam artışı yaklaşık yüzde 3,3. Son 7 yılda istihdam artışı yüzde 3’te kaldı. Hadi iyimser olalım ve büyümenin daha fazla istihdam yaratacağını kabul edelim. Nereden baksak yine en az yüzde 5 büyüme gerekiyor.

Gördüğünüz gibi, tüm yollar nasıl Roma’ya çıkıyorsa, 2023 hedefleri de ihracata dayalı yüzde 5 büyümeye çıkıyor. Ama bunu nasıl başaracağımız bana göre meçhul. 

Not much room to maneuver

For today's column I hesitated between two issues: the promises made in a booklet distributed Sunday during the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) congress, which can be considered the party's new political reform agenda, and the economic policies debate, the temperature of which has continued to rise. I decided to opt for the most urgent issue, that is, the economic policies debate, and to leave my comments on the new agenda for Friday.
The answer to the question of “What should be right policy mix?” which was discussed in my Sept. 24 column “Looking for the right policy mix,” has become, indeed, a very critical issue about not only the future of the current adjustment process but also the future of the consensus on the economic regime put in place in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis and adopted by the AK Party during its years in government. When Zafer Çağlayan, the minister of economy, opened the economic policy debate following the publication of the second quarter gross domestic product (GDP) figures that confirmed the low growth of the economy, I wrote in my column “Second quarter confirms worries about low growth” (Sept. 10) that “there is a serious risk of abandoning the adjustment process too early,” and I ended my article by saying that it would not be “easy to decide for the great referee”. I do not know if it was easy or not for the prime minister to decide, but it seems that that he took a decision: He backs the fiscal discipline but insists on the loosening of Turkey's monetary policy. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, coming from the business world like Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan and like many other AK Party managers and supporters, believes in the virtues of a balanced budget. Accumulation of debt frightens him. On every occasion you can hear him relating gladly the pitiful situation in which Greece and other southern European countries found themselves because of long-lasting budget deficits that caused colossal mountains of debt. Moreover, fiscal discipline is not just a moral attitude but is a decisive piece in the economic stabilization of the Turkish economy under AK Party rule. I fully agree with Mehmet Şimşek, the finance minister, and with Durmuş Yılmaz, the previous governor of the central bank, who each explained last Friday that decreasing budget deficits decreased both inflation expectations and inflation itself, as well as real interest rates, dramatically decreasing in turn interest expenditures. They restated that in 2002, more than 80 percent of tax revenue was allocated to interest payments, while today this has decreased to around 15 percent. In this achievement, the decisive role of fiscal discipline is obvious, but let me note that the global crisis, nowadays called the “Great Recession,” pushed down further the real interest rates of public debt and they currently remain at 1-2 percent. The debt burden relief permitted the AK Party to increase public expenditures without jeopardizing the budget balance so that an impressive improvement of public services were made possible which, in turn, filled the ballot boxes with AK Party votes. So far, so good. Nevertheless, I have a caveat about the fiscal policy. I support the continuation of fiscal discipline but I have two objections. The first one is about the size of the deficit. The government should not insist on the planned 1.5 percent deficit, which is related to 4 percent growth. For a lower growth, which seems to be the case today, a higher deficit is desirable as long as the debt burden does not increase. Concretely, this means that a 2.5 percent deficit is quite acceptable. My second objection is about the quality of the fiscal policy. Limiting public expenditures must be preferred rather than increasing indirect taxes, which push inflation up and narrow the space for maneuvering by the central bank for a controlled relaxing of monetary policy. Of course, it is much easier to increase indirect taxes than to freeze expenditures, particularly when elections are in sight. Currently, the central bank faces increasing pressures pushing it to loosen monetary policy. Erdoğan made clear that he wants to see lower interest rates, backing Çağlayan in his battle for stepping on the gas pedal. But the problem is that by law, the central bank conducts its monetary policy independently to reach the inflation target, which is set together with the government. This target is already set at 5 percent, and we are still far from this level. Getting inflation down obliges the central bank to avoid either an abrupt depreciation of the Turkish lira or a new boom in domestic demand. To do this it has to keep the real interest rates low but positive. This is exactly the case right now. Further attempts at loosening can easily provoke adverse effects on inflation expectations, causing an exchange rate shock, as well as increasing market interest rates. If the disinflation process goes well in the coming months, I am sure the central bank will envisage relaxing the interest rates. But I am afraid that the show of strength engaged in by Çağlayan with the central bank risks questioning the consensus on the current economic regime based on the low inflation-low budget deficit. Çağlayan made a dangerous step ahead in the debate by declaring that the central bank is a bank of the country and thus if it insists on keeping its foot on the brake, its independence should be discussed. I hope that the aim of Çağlayan is not questioning the consensus on the economic regime but just the dosage of the monetary policy.