29 Ekim 2013 Salı

Income inequality: a highly controversial subject

The most popular economic topic of recent months was low growth. Nowadays the focus seems to have shifted towards another hot topic: income inequality.
Last week Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan declared that economic growth must alleviate poverty. Umut Onaran, a deputy chairman of the Republican People's Party (CHP), published a very critical evaluation of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government's economic performance, claiming that the standard of living in Turkey has not improved, while income inequality has worsened. As the elections approach, I think we will be talking more about inequality and poverty.
Representation of the income distribution
by Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient 
What do the figures say about this controversy? Since 2006, the Turkish Statistics Institute (TurkStat) has published some measures of inequality based on Income and Living Conditions surveys, whose samples are sufficiently large to give a picture at the regional level. The 2012 figures were published recently. Thus, the period in question does not cover the entire AK Party era (2003-2012), but it allows us to observe the evolution of income inequality in the recent period.
Before considering the TurkStat figures, let us recall that the relationship between economic growth and income inequality is not straightforward. Since the work of Simon Kuznets, it is largely believed that income inequality increases in the first years of economic development, while it begins to decline in the years of maturation. This inverted “U” form of the so-called “Kuznet's curve” is largely explained by the transition from an agricultural economy, where income inequality is relatively low, to an industrial economy characterized by low wages in the first years while wages increase along with labor productivity during the years of maturation.
However, income inequality measures show that in a large number of developed countries income inequality continued to increase from the 1990s due to an increase in wage inequality between wage laborers, the reason being the widening wage gap between qualified and unqualified labor. Thus, it is not certain that economic growth will alleviate poverty automatically.
Having said that, let's look at the TurkStat figures. TurkStat publishes two measures of inequality, the Gini coefficient and the S80/S20 ratio, plus one measure of poverty, the Relative Poverty (RP) headcount ratio. The Gini coefficient, varying from 0 to 1, is a measure taking into consideration the differences in income from each individual to others. The value of 0 means perfect equality while 1 means that one individual has the entire income. The S80/S20 measures the relationship of the 20 percent holding the greatest distribution of income to the 20 percent holding the least. It can be considered a more sensitive inequality measure than Gini in terms of changes in poverty. The RP ratio measures the percentage of individuals in the total population with an income amounting to less than 60 percent of the median income. As such, it is a measure of income inequality rather than a direct measure of poverty.
What do the data say? The Gini coefficient was at 0.428 in 2006 -- note that this was the highest in Europe -- and then decreased to 0.405 in 2008, increased to 0.415 with the economic crisis of 2009, decreased again with the strong recovery to 0.402 in 2010 and has now been stagnant for two years. The same pattern is observed in the S80/S20 and RP ratios. From 9.5 in 2006, the S80/S20 ratio decreased to 8.1 in 2008 before increasing to 8.5 in 2009. Finally it decreased to 8.0 in 2010 and maintained this level for the following two years. More or less, the RP ratio followed this pattern: From 25 percent, it declined to 22.6 in 2011 and kept this level in 2012, the economic crisis having a very limited effect on RP.
Without a doubt, income inequality has decreased, albeit modestly, in the last six years. However, most of the improvement occurred before the crisis, a period during which growth was based largely on gains in labor productivity (see my column “Turkey on the brink of middle income trap,” Sept. 2, 2013). I have also to note that in two regions, İstanbul and the Mediterranean area, income inequality increased in recent years while it was decreasing in others, the three best performers being Western Anatolia, Central Anatolia and the Eastern Black Sea.
Although the average growth rate reached 5 percent in the last two years, the improvement in income inequality halted overall while varying a lot between different regions. Will these conflicting patterns have an impact on the AK Party's votes, particularly in İstanbul, next March? We know that voting patterns do not depend only on well-being, but we shall see.

26 Ekim 2013 Cumartesi

A very difficult trinity

The title is inspired by the well-known "Impossible Trinity" of macroeconomics, which asserts that one cannot pursue the following three goals at the same time: Fixing the exchange rate, having an independent interest rate policy and free capital movement.
But I would like to discuss today a different trinity. On Wednesday evening, I have been the host of the the minister of family and social policy, Mrs. Fatma Şahin, and the minister of development, Mr. Cevdet Yılmaz, at a working dinner where a very informative presentation was made followed by a hot debate on the crucial problem of the aging population and policies to mitigate the adverse consequences of this problem.
Ministers Fatma Şahin & Cevdet yılmaz
Minister Yılmaz defined very well the strategic framework: The Turkish population is rapidly aging while the birth rate is declining. The decline in the average number of children per woman last year reached 2.1, and this is expected, according to Turkish Statistics Institute (TurkStat) projections, to decline to 1.65 in the mid-2030s. The already increasing share of individuals over 65 in the total population will reach 16 percent by the end 2030s from its current share of 8 percent, while at the same time the share of the working-age population will reach a peak and start to decrease. In other words, the so called "window of opportunity" will be closed for Turkey at that time. The aging phenomenon is not, of course, specific to Turkey. Nevertheless, as Minister Yılmaz correctly pointed out, most of the countries facing an aging population have already achieved economic development and have put more resources into resolving this issue than countries that have not yet completed their development process, like Turkey. So, the consequences of the aging problem may be more severe in Turkey than in developed European countries.
What to do? The two ministries suggest a strategy comprising three goals: Stop the decline in the birth rate through various incentives; accelerate female labor force participation by encouraging women to work; and achieve these two goals without putting an extra financial burden on firms. Admittedly, this is the right trinity, but it is very difficult to achieve. Modern life negatively affects the number of children per woman. This is a rule of thumb that is almost impossible to change. However, during the presentation attention was drawn to an interesting finding. There is a gap between the number of children considered “ideal” and the "effective" number of children. This gap is particularly large among educated women who have a decent job. So, there is a room to maneuver. The policy recommendation consists of facilitating childcare through flexible working hours, longer maternity leave, etc.
It is true that these kinds of incentives might be effective, as the examples shown in the presentation proved, but to a limited extent. Thus, the aging population will continue although it can be decelerated and the closing of the window of opportunity postponed, giving more time to Turkey for its economic development. That said, another opportunity exists for Turkey. Its female participation rate is very low, around 30 percent. So, the present increase of this rate can be accelerated using aggressive incentives making childcare less costly, encouraging part-time work, lowering the cost of female labor for employers and last but not least, combating social prejudices against working women. The rapid increase of the number of working women will also be able to accelerate economic growth, and in this way the adverse consequences of aging can be better addressed. However, we know that more working women means fewer children, and the policies trying to prevent the decline of the birth rate can hardly compensate for the negative effect of the increase in working women.
Moreover, as promised by the two ministers, all the financial costs of the various incentives being considered will be met by the state. Now, there are other indirect costs than financial costs for companies, like long absences due to maternity leave. So the birth incentives are able to cause discrimination against women at hiring that will cause in turn an increase in female unemployment.
Finally, the task will not be easy for the government. It might be easier to consider another approach to the aging problem as was suggested by my colleague Eser Karakaş during the debate: a planned and controlled immigration of a qualified labor force from neighboring countries. In fact, this immigration has existed for some time, and it has been dramatically increased recently because of the Syrian civil war. Unfortunately, it is neither planned nor controlled.       

22 Ekim 2013 Salı

Ekonomi yönetiminde çatlak mı var?

Ali Babacan Başbakanı nasıl ikna etti?
Ak Parti hükümetinin içinde ekonomi politikaları konusunda zaman zaman görüş ayrılıklarının ortaya çıktığını biliyoruz. Örneğin önemli bir görüş ayrılığı ‘mali kural’ konusunda yaşanmıştı. O dönemde ‘mali kural’ taslağının hamisi ekonomiden sorumlu Başbakan Yardımcısı Ali Babacan’ın ne kadar zor durumda kaldığını çok iyi hatırlıyorum. Para poltikası-döviz kuru bağlamında Ekonomi Bakanı Zafer Çağlayan’ın zaman zaman Merkez Bankası’na yönelttiği eleştiriler de hafızamızda tazeliğini koruyor.

Ama sanırım en önemli görüş ayrılığı haziran ayında Başbakan’ın ‘faiz lobisi’ çıkışı sırasında yaşandı. Bu şaşırtıcı çıkışı zamanında çok tartıştık. ABD Merkez Bankası (FED) Başkanı Bernanke’nin tahvil alımlarına yavaş yavaş son vereceklerine dair açıklaması Gezi Parkı protestolarının en yoğun yaşandığı günlere denk gelmiş, döviz kuru ve piyasa faizleri sermaye çıkışları sonucu hızla yükselmeye, borsa düşmeye başlamıştı. Bu ortamda bizzat Başbakan ve yakın çevresi tarafından ortaya atılan komplo teorisine göre düşük faiz politikasından memnun olmayan büyük oyuncular Ak Parti iktidarını yıpratmak için sermayelerini çekmeye başlamışlardı.

Bir pazar akşamı, Dolmabahçe’de
Olan bitenin aslında hiç de gizemli bir tarafı yoktu. Yüksek cari açık veren pek çok ülkede olduğu gibi Türkiye’de de yerli/yabancı pek çok yatırımcı FED’in para politikasını sıkılaştırma perspektifi karşısında gardlarını alıyorlardı. Buna karşılık ‘faiz lobisi’ iddiası, dünya ekonomisi ile bütünleşmiş bir açık piyasa ekonomisinin yönetilme kabiliyetinin sorgulanmasına neden oldu ve ekonomiye yaklaşımda radikal bir değişiklik ihtimali tartışılmaya başladı. Sonra ne olduğunu biliyoruz. Durum daha fazla vahimleşmeden bir pazar akşamı Başbakan’ın başkanlığında ekonomiden sorumlu tüm bakanlar ile Dolmabahçe’de kritik bir toplantı yapıldı. Toplantının ardından yapılan kısa açıklamada ekonominin açık piyasa ekonomisinin kurallarına göre yönetilmeye devam edeceği vurgulandı. Ertesi gün de Merkez Bankası Başkanı Erdem Başçı yaptığı basın toplantısında bağımsız para politikasına halel gelmeyeceğini kesin bir dille vurguladı.

Hükümetin içinde nasıl bir tartışma yaşandığını, toplantı için kimin bastırdığını, toplantıda Başbakan’ın nasıl ikna edildiğini bilmiyoruz. Umarım günün birinde öğreniriz. Toplantının ardından ‘faiz lobisi’ söylemi son buldu ve işler normale döndü. İlk günden itibaren Dolmabahçe toplantısının çok kritik bir dönüm noktası olduğunu düşünüyorum. Tahminim faiz lobisi suçlamaları ayyuka çıkarken suskunluğunu korumayı başaran Babacan’ın bir şekilde Başbakan’ı gidişatın vahameti konusunda ikna etmeyi başardığı.

‘İlerleme Raporu’nun iması

“İyi de bu geriye dönüş nereden çıktı” dediğinizi duyar gibiyim. Şuradan çıktı: AB’nin kısa süre önce açıklanan ‘İlerleme Raporu’nun ekonomi bölümüne göz gezdirirken oldukça gizemli bir ifadeyle karşılaştım. AB Bakanlığı’nın gayri resmi Türkçe çevirisinden aynen aktarıyorum: “Devlet kurumlarının sorumluluklarındaki parçalı yapı, bütçeleme ve orta vadeli ekonomi politikalarının oluşturulmasında koordinasyonu karmaşık kılmaya devam etmektedir. Bununla birlikte, ekonomi politikaları son dönemde iç anlaşmazlıklar ve gerginliklerden etkilenmemiş gözükmektedir. Sonuç olarak, ekonomi politikasının temel unsurlarına ilişkin mutabakat korunmaktadır.”

Bu oldukça kapalı ifade bana göre açıkça yukarıda özetlemeye çalıştığım ekonomi yönetiminde bu yaz yaşanan çatlağa gönderme yapıyor. Konunun ‘İlerleme Raporu’nda yer alması önemli. Ama daha önemlisi küçük bir ayrıntıda yatıyor. İngilizce orijinal metinde son cümlede “mutabakat görünürde (apparently) kurtarıldı” yazıyor. Türkçe çeviride nedense ‘görünürde’ kelimesi atlanmış.

Reversal of the brain drain

The brain drain from developing countries to developed ones has been debated for decades. A number of economists consider this drain a resource transfer from the poor to the rich.
The argument is that developing countries make a valuable investment in the education of these elites, but when the time comes for their return, they fly to developed countries which profit free of charge from the human capital accumulated in these elites. This claim is only partly true. The literature of institutional economics has held for a long time that to benefit from the crème de la crème in a developing country, one needs a developed academic and research environment that is lacking in developing countries.
That said, the actual question in the development debate is how we can reverse the brain drain. The Turkish government recently raised this question and tried to formulate an answer. The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK), a governmental body in charge of financing research projects, decided a short time ago to offer financial incentives for the return of Turkish academics and researchers working in developed countries.
According to Science and Technology Minister Nihat Ergün, interviewed yesterday by the Radikal daily, applications for the TÜBİTAK grant have increased fivefold this year over last year. The number of individual applications has reached 117 this year, 74 of which have been accepted while 31 are still under evaluation. Of these applications, 75 percent came from Turkish academics established in the US while the rest were from various countries such as Germany, the UK and Italy. Almost 90 percent of applicants preferred top universities such as Middle East Technical University (ODTÜ), Bilkent University and Sabancı University.
Although the number of applicants has multiplied by five, their number (117) is still quite small for a country of 75 million inhabitants. I do not know how many Turkish academics are working abroad, but I estimate they must be in the thousands. We should take TÜBİTAK's step as a starting point that shows its intentions. According to Radikal, the grant offered is limited to $1,650 per month over two years. A fund of $12,500 is available for various expenses related to the research project. Frankly speaking, I do not think these financial incentives are sufficient for a Turkish academic or researcher who is well-integrated into the research facilities of another country to decide to return to Turkey. Associate Professor Şükrü Sadık Öner, who returned from the US, told Radikal that “the incentives must be increased to accelerate the reversal of the brain drain, as the existent incentives are persuasive only for Turkish academics who are already hesitant about remaining in the US.” Öner added that “there are also other obstacles, for example the procurement of research materials which are available in the US the day after the request is made, while in Turkey, procurement through public contracts take too much time.”
Clearly, financial incentives must be increased, but they should also be differentiated according to the research record of the applicant as well as the nature of the project proposed. Nonetheless, larger financial incentives will not be sufficient to start a strong reversal of the brain drain. Here we return to what I noted at the beginning of the article: The institutional framework matters more than financial incentives. Returning academics need to find an environment that is amenable to their research agenda. Such an environment cannot be created in a top-down, centralized manner. This environment needs a competitive market structure that should be composed of financially and academically autonomous universities and research centers, either private or public. The establishment of such an environment requires a radical reform of tertiary education, a big bang that will reverse not only the existing centralized and authoritarian system but also our mentality concerning the duty of the state in tertiary education.
The basic principles of such reform are repeated every year in the Medium-Term Program, but no action has been taken up until now. In any case, this is better than nothing; we can at least continue to hope.    

19 Ekim 2013 Cumartesi

A mysterious passage in the Progress Report

The most-discussed document of the week has been the European Union's annual progress report on Turkey. As usual, its comments focused almost exclusively on politics, trying to assess whether the EU's ideas of democracy and human rights are being satisfied or not.
Is there a coherence in economic governance? 
Readers, I believe, should be well aware of the criticism and praise for the report. But what about the economy? I cannot claim to have examined all the press, but at least in the newspapers I looked at, I did not find any comment on those chapters of the report concerning the Turkish economy.
Thus, while searching for interesting topics for this column I thought that commenting on the economic section of the report would be a good idea. So, I carefully read the pages concerned with economic assessment but, at the risk of disappointing you, I could not find any striking comments regarding the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government and the economy. All the report pointed out was the fragility of the Turkish economy because of the increasing current account deficit, which presents a risk of recession through capital reversal, and the document recommended structural reforms in order to make the Turkish economy more resilient. However, one mysterious passage that seems to be related to the consistency of economic governance drew my attention.
I quote from the report: “The fragmentation of responsibilities between government bodies continues to complicate the coordination of budgeting and medium term policy-making. However, it seems that economic policies have not been affected by internal conflicts and tension in recent times. Overall, the consensus on economic policy essentials has apparently been preserved.” So, what problem is the report hinting at? Let's start by noting the key words: “fragmentation of responsibilities,” “complicate the coordination,” “internal conflicts and tension in recent times” and “apparently.”
Is there a fragmentation of responsibilities between government bodies complicating the coordination of its economic policies? Apparently not, since Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan is in charge of economic coordination, the central bank is independent in its monetary policy and there is no conflict between Governor Erdem Başçı and Babacan. Nonetheless, since the last-minute rejection of the 'fiscal policy' by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan two years ago, which was considered a necessity by Babacan, we feel that there are two opposing approaches to the economy in the government: On one side, Babacan and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek, supported by the economic bureaucracy, defend an economic policy approach in line with the rules of a free-market economy integrated with the world economy, and on the other side we see others such as Minister of Economy Zafer Çağlayan defending a more pragmatic, one might say “populist,” approach. The critical point is that the prime minister seems to belong to this second camp.
This internal conflict, which has existed at least since the elections of June 2011, has become an open argument in recent times. Erdoğan has from time to time criticized high interest rates, asserting that the best way to fight inflation is to lower them. As the central bank is fortunately independent, these remarks did not have any effect on its interest rate policy, but political pressure on the central bank continued to increase. However, when the Federal Reserve's chairman, Ben Bernanke, made his famous announcement of the end of monetary easing last May, while at the same time the Gezi Park protests in Taksim Square were coincidentally intensifying, hot money started to leave Turkey, pushing up the market interest rates. Erdoğan seized the opportunity by making an open attack against “the interest rate lobby.” His claims were so unconvincing that investors' confidence in the consistency of Turkey's economic policy began to erode. This dangerous development has been stopped in extremis by Babacan's efforts at a critical meeting in the Dolmabahçe office with the prime minister and other ministers with various economic responsibilities. A short communiqué stating that the rules of a free-market economy will be respected was published after the meeting, and the following day Başçı gave a press conference maintaining that the independence of the central bank was still intact.
Well, as the Progress Report says, “the consensus on economic policy essentials has apparently been preserved.”

Artık harekete geçme zamanı

Yapısal reformlar siyasal iradeyi bekliyor
Bugün bayramın ikinci günü. Tüm okurlara iyi bayramlar diliyorum. Yaygın geleneğe göre bugün ‘hafif’ bir konu yazmam uygun olurdu. Ama yine ‘ağır’ bir konuyu gündeme getirmek zorundayım. Geçen hafta açıklanan 2014-2016 dönemi Orta Vadeli Program’ı (OVP) tartışmak istiyorum. Konu önemli çünkü çok kritik bir döneme rast geldi. OVP halen yaşanmakta olan düşük ve kalitesiz büyümeyi tersyüz etmeyi amaçlıyor. Bu başarılamazsa Türkiye’nin kimyası bozulabilir. OVP’nin koyduğu hedefler uçuk değil ama ulaşılmaları da hiç kolay değil çünkü siyaseten zor reformları gerektiriyorlar; üstelik üç seçimin yaşanacağı bir dönemde.

Dengeli büyüme
OVP’nin temel amacı, ekonomiyi yüzde 4-5’lik dengeli bir büyüme patikasına oturtmak. Ortalıkta uçuk kaçık büyüme rakamları dolaşıyor. Yüzde 4-5 yetmezmiş, yüzde 6-7 büyümeliymişiz. Üstüne basa basa belirtmek istiyorum: Üretim faktörleri kapasitemiz açısından hesaplar yüzde 5’i bir üst sınır olarak gösteriyor. Yakalayabilirsek büyük başarı olur. Yakalayabilmek için de büyüme, OVP’nin hedeflediği gibi, dengeli olmak zorunda. Bu şu demek oluyor: Talep yönünden net ihracat büyümeye pozitif katkı yapacak. Diğer ifadeyle ihracat ithalattan daha hızlı artacak ki halen artma eğiliminde olan cari açık azalsın. OVP cari açığın yüzde 7’den 2016’da yüzde 5,5 düzeyine inmesini öngörüyor.

Üretim faktörleri yönünden ise toplam faktör verimliliğinin (TFP) büyümeye nispeten yüksek katkı yapması bekleniyor. Ancak işin vahameti şu ki TFP katkısı bu yıl negatif. Bu soruna dikkat çekmiştim (‘Türkiye orta gelir tuzağının eşiğinde’). OVP bunu itiraf ediyor. Tahmini bir hesap da yapmış: Bu yıl yüzde 3,6 tahmin ettiği büyüme oranının 2,5 puanı sermaye stoku artışından, 2 puanı da istihdam artışından kaynaklanıyor. 0.9 puanlık verimlilk azalışı ise büyümeyi aşağıya çekiyor. Bu halden önümüzdeki üç yılda TFP katkısını yaklaşık 0,85 puan pozitife geçireceğiz.

Her yerde reform Bunlar olmayacak işler değil ancak hükümetin kapsamlı ve doğru reformlar yapması gerekiyor. OVP iç tasarrufları üç yılda 3,5 puan arttırmayı hedefliyor. Bu artışın 3 puanı özel kesimden gelecek. OVP’yi dikkatle taramama rağmen bu konuda dişe dokunur pek bir şey bulamadım. Sadece kullanılabilir gelir ile borçlanma arasında denge kuracak, diğer ifadeyle tüketicileri ayaklarını yorganlarına göre uzatmaya zorlayacak önemlerden söz ediliyor. Taksit sınırlaması ve kredi tayınlaması gibi önlemler gündemde. Ancak bunların öngörülen tasarruf artışını sağlayabilecekleri kuşkulu. Bu arada firma tasarruflarından bahis yok.

Buna karşılık 0,5 puan arttırılması hedeflenen kamu kesimi tasarrufları konusunda ümit var. Personel harcamaları dışında diğer kamu harcamaları sıkı bir diyete tabi tutulacak. Sıfır tabanlı bütçe vaadi var. Gerçekleşirse küçük çapta devrim olur. Ayrıca kamu programlarında etki analizi şart koşuluyor. Tek defalık gelirler, harcamaları arttırmada kullanılmayacak. Uzatmayalım, kamu harcamalarının milli gelir içindeki payı azaltılacak, aynı zamanda kaynaklar etkin kullanılacak, verimsiz destekler yerine Ar-Ge’ye ve verimli yatırımlara yönlendirilecek.
Verimliği arttıracak pek çok isabetli reform da OVP’de yer alıyor. Eğitim kalitesini arttırmak, vasıfların piyasa talebi ile uyumunun sağlanması hedefleniyor. Kıdem tazminatı reformu zorunluluktur deniyor. İşgücü piyasasının bölgesel özelliklerini dikkate alan istihdam politikaları, kayıtdışılık ile amansız mücadele, enerji verimliliğini ve rekabeti arttıracak politikalar vaat ediliyor.

Buraya kadar her şey tamam. Ancak bu reformlar daha önceki OVP’lerde de büyük ölçüde yer alıyordu. Tekrarlar sıkmaya başladı. Artık harekete geçme zamanı.

12 Ekim 2013 Cumartesi

How is the Turkish economy going?

Last week was rich in economic events and information. First, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published its routine economic assessment in which it expressed some caustic criticism of Turkey's economic policies and forecast rather low growth for the near future.
Then at the beginning of the week, the medium-term economic program (OVP) for the years 2014-2016 was announced by the government, which forecast rather optimistic growth rates and unemployment dropping slightly in the coming years. Finally, the Turkish Statistics Institute (TurkStat) on Friday published the monthly labor market figures for the period of June-August which showed a jump in unemployment, increasing from 9.7 percent in June to 10.1 percent in July. So when I consider all these, my answer to the question in the title is: The Turkish economy is not going very well. But there are also some reasons to be optimistic.
Let's start with the IMF's criticisms. The feared organization does not agree with the multidimensional monetary policy employed by the Central Bank of Turkey for almost two years. The IMF believes this new policy addressing inflation as well as a stable and competitive real exchange rate using unconventional instruments is inconsistent when the risks stemming from the tightening of the Fed's monetary policy in the future are considered. Concretely, the IMF thinks the large current account deficit (CAD) cannot be financed if the policy interest rate of 4.5, well below the current inflation rate of 7 percent, is not increased. Turkey's fiscal policy was also in a mire according to the IMF. It admitted that this year's fiscal policy targets will be reached but said there are reasons to be worried in the future because public spending is rapidly increasing while part of the public revenue increases originate from privatization and tax amnesties. The IMF suggested a further tightening of the fiscal policy in order to increase the primary surplus.
If these recommendations are followed, what will happen? The growth rate will be lower than the IMF's forecast of 3.5 percent for the next year. The logic behind this double tightening is that if the macroeconomic unbalances, like a large CAD or high inflation, are not fixed in time, the risk of severe adjustments that could provoke a recession will dramatically increase. Thus, it would be wiser to make the necessary adjustments now, even if growth slows further. This is the only way, according to the IMF, to put the Turkish economy back on its potential growth path of 4-5 percent.
The OVP disagrees with the IMF's criticisms regarding monetary policy; me too. The OVP backs the central bank's unconventional policies. The IMF disregards one critical consequence of high interest rates: the risk of the appreciation of the lira that would contradict the aim of narrowing the CAD and put economic growth on a balanced path. The question of inflation remains, of course. The central bank and the government intend to address this question using instruments other than the policy interest rate, such as controlling credit expansion by different measures or using the interest rate corridor to keep market interest rates relatively high. The OVP is confident of falling inflation that would come closer to the targeted 5 percent in the coming years. I hope they will succeed.
However, the government fully agrees with the IMF in terms of tightening its fiscal policy. This is rather a nice good surprise when one considers that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) will be facing important electoral challenges in the coming months. Indeed, the OVP plans to reduce the general public deficit from 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) this year to 0.5 percent in the next year and to increase the primary surplus from 0.9 percent to 1.3 percent through a reduction of the share of public expenditure in GDP. Fiscal policy being a unique discretionary instrument at the government's disposal ensures that the political will is sufficient to achieve these fiscal targets.
In this context, the OVP forecasts 4 percent growth for 2014 and 5 percent for the next two years, while the unemployment rate will fall slightly from the unrealistically estimated 9.5 percent this year to 8.9 percent in 2016. The targeted growth rates as well as the unemployment rates are not exaggerated but quite challenging. There is broad consensus that 4-5 percent growth rates are achievable, and if they are attained, a fall in unemployment will follow. Nevertheless, achieving this growth performance requires the implementation of a comprehensive reform agenda. This will be the topic of this column next Tuesday.