Last weekend I was in Diyarbakır with my friend and
colleague Şahin Alpay. We were invited by Muhammed Akar, the president of the
Olive Branch Peace Platform, a civil society association that encourages a pluralistic
view, and by Selahaddin Eyyubi University, a recently established private
foundation university. We met with representatives from almost
all the political movements as well as with the civil society groups working on
the Kurdish issue during our two days there. I must confess that I became aware
of the fact that the political, social and cultural realties of the region are
much more complicated than the simplistic view of considering the Kurdish issue
essentially a settlement process between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and
the Justice and Development Party (AKP), or between Kurds and Turks. I will try
to describe this complex reality and share my personal comments in the next few
columns.
Let's start today with the current hot issue: the election of the president of the republic. It is no secret that I support Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, the joint candidate of the opposition. So, I was very curious to know how his candidacy is perceived in Diyarbakır. Well, the answer is, not very well. All my Kurdish interlocutors said they will not vote for Mr. İhsanoğlu, even in a second round. I have been told that İhsanoğlu can only get the votes of Turkmen Alevi in the region. They particularly reproach İhsanoğlu for not condemning the Halepçe massacre while he was secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). He is perceived as an elite representative of the Turkish state and, moreover, as the candidate of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) rather than of the Republican People's Party (CHP).
On the other hand, the candidate of Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), most likely to be Selahattin Demirtaş, has broad support; it is not limited to PKK sympathizers. Nonstop effort is being made to convince independent AKP voters to support the HDP candidate in the first round. The aim is obvious: to show Erdoğan the strength of the Kurdish cause and push him to take the demands of the Kurdish movement, like a general amnesty, education in the mother tongue and collective rights, more seriously. Preventing the election of Erdoğan in first round is the basic strategy in the region. I asked Abdullah Demirbaş, the previous mayor of Diyarbakır's Sur district, what the vote share of the HDP candidate might be and what voting behavior in the second round might look like. He answered that he does not expect more than 9 percent on Aug. 10 and that the HDP will either ask for a boycott of the ballot boxes or tell its electors they're free to vote how they wish in the second round. In these circumstances, I think that even If Mr. Erdoğan does not succeed in being elected in the first round, he will in the second.
As for the settlement process, one can see significant support for the cease-fire status. We have been told that in the last few months a regional power put great pressure on the PKK to break the cease-fire, but thanks to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's determination, a return to armed violence has been avoided. That said, beyond a non-fighting status, the way to reach a final solution to the Kurdish problem is far from clear. I was surprised to see how the goals and strategies differ according to various pro-Kurdish movements. Paradoxically, the PKK line asks for a “minimal program,” while other leftist, conservative or Islamic movements ask for a “maximal program.” During our meeting with the permanent members of the Democratic Society Congress (DTK), a kind of de facto parliament consisting of representatives of civil society associations and institutions close to the PKK, we were told that the recent legal framework announced by the AKP government is a very positive step but that the content is empty. It must fulfill three major basic measures: general amnesty -- including Öcalan -- the right to an education in the mother tongue and regional autonomy. I have to underline that this regional autonomy is not to be exclusively for “Northern Kurdistan” but a devolution embracing the entire country.
The right to an education in the mother tongue has become a red line for all Kurdish movements. Aside from this common demand, however, there are quite different views about the organization of collective rights and the institutional set up it requires. The Rights and Freedoms Party (Hak-Par), representing a coalition of old Kurdish socialist and democratic movements, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), representing the historical conservative pro-Kurdish movement and which is close to Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani's KDP, as well as some representatives of İslamist associations ask for a federal solution.
Saturday I will discuss the debate on suggested solutions for the medium and long term more comprehensively.
Let's start today with the current hot issue: the election of the president of the republic. It is no secret that I support Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, the joint candidate of the opposition. So, I was very curious to know how his candidacy is perceived in Diyarbakır. Well, the answer is, not very well. All my Kurdish interlocutors said they will not vote for Mr. İhsanoğlu, even in a second round. I have been told that İhsanoğlu can only get the votes of Turkmen Alevi in the region. They particularly reproach İhsanoğlu for not condemning the Halepçe massacre while he was secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). He is perceived as an elite representative of the Turkish state and, moreover, as the candidate of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) rather than of the Republican People's Party (CHP).
On the other hand, the candidate of Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), most likely to be Selahattin Demirtaş, has broad support; it is not limited to PKK sympathizers. Nonstop effort is being made to convince independent AKP voters to support the HDP candidate in the first round. The aim is obvious: to show Erdoğan the strength of the Kurdish cause and push him to take the demands of the Kurdish movement, like a general amnesty, education in the mother tongue and collective rights, more seriously. Preventing the election of Erdoğan in first round is the basic strategy in the region. I asked Abdullah Demirbaş, the previous mayor of Diyarbakır's Sur district, what the vote share of the HDP candidate might be and what voting behavior in the second round might look like. He answered that he does not expect more than 9 percent on Aug. 10 and that the HDP will either ask for a boycott of the ballot boxes or tell its electors they're free to vote how they wish in the second round. In these circumstances, I think that even If Mr. Erdoğan does not succeed in being elected in the first round, he will in the second.
As for the settlement process, one can see significant support for the cease-fire status. We have been told that in the last few months a regional power put great pressure on the PKK to break the cease-fire, but thanks to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's determination, a return to armed violence has been avoided. That said, beyond a non-fighting status, the way to reach a final solution to the Kurdish problem is far from clear. I was surprised to see how the goals and strategies differ according to various pro-Kurdish movements. Paradoxically, the PKK line asks for a “minimal program,” while other leftist, conservative or Islamic movements ask for a “maximal program.” During our meeting with the permanent members of the Democratic Society Congress (DTK), a kind of de facto parliament consisting of representatives of civil society associations and institutions close to the PKK, we were told that the recent legal framework announced by the AKP government is a very positive step but that the content is empty. It must fulfill three major basic measures: general amnesty -- including Öcalan -- the right to an education in the mother tongue and regional autonomy. I have to underline that this regional autonomy is not to be exclusively for “Northern Kurdistan” but a devolution embracing the entire country.
The right to an education in the mother tongue has become a red line for all Kurdish movements. Aside from this common demand, however, there are quite different views about the organization of collective rights and the institutional set up it requires. The Rights and Freedoms Party (Hak-Par), representing a coalition of old Kurdish socialist and democratic movements, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), representing the historical conservative pro-Kurdish movement and which is close to Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani's KDP, as well as some representatives of İslamist associations ask for a federal solution.
Saturday I will discuss the debate on suggested solutions for the medium and long term more comprehensively.
Hiç yorum yok:
Yorum Gönder