This coup opened the way for the “fitna” (internal fight in Arabic), and
a civil war followed in 11th century. The political divisions in the country
and the long-lasting political instability paved the way for the Reconquista,
though it still took almost two centuries, beginning with the fall of Cordoba
in 1236 and ending with the surrender of Granada in 1492.
While I was admiring the legacy of the Andalusia civilization, my mind
was on my country's economic turmoil that has deep political roots. In
countries where independent economic institutions are not well established
and the separation of the economy from the polity is not secured, political
uncertainties may cause great damage to the economy.
I think this is a shortcut explanation of what is happening nowadays in
Turkey. In my recent columns I tried to explain why the Central Bank must
react to the unending climb of the exchange rate through an increase in the
interest rates. I was aware that the causes of this steady rise were mostly
to be found in the current political crisis, but a reaction from the Central
Bank was needed because the wait-and-see policy has been risking further
deepening concerns with respect to its independence. Last Tuesday, the
monetary policy committee (MPC) contented itself with a very timid reaction:
It decided to sell money some days at 9 percent instead of 7.75 percent. This
did not convince economic actors at all and the exchange rate breaks new
records every day.
When I came back from my short holiday, I got up to date on the events
and comments that I had missed. What struck me the most was the efforts of
Mr. Babacan, the deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs, trying
to convince an audience in Davos that the exchange rate shock is transitory,
the EU anchor is solid, the adverse effects of Turkish firms' debts on their
balance sheets are exaggerated and last, but not least, that the independence
of the Central Bank is not at stake, despite the unfortunate statements of
some ministers. So, here are Babacan's arguments in a nutshell and my brief
comments.
Babacan believes that the exchange rate shock is transitory since the
shock did not have its origin in capital outflows, but was due to panicky
purchases of hard currencies by Turkish firms that are indebted to “some
extent.” The fact that foreign capital is not flying out is certainly good
news, but not enough to conclude that the shock is transitory. If Turkish
firms purchase US dollars at very high rates, this means that they expect
further depreciation of the Turkish lira. The question is: How will these
dangerous expectations be reversed? Mr. Babacan offers only some weak
arguments. He claims that the “EU anchor is solid” and that the political
uncertainties will soon dissipate. Yes, the EU anchor is in place for the
moment, but no one can guarantee that this will be the case if the government
insists in its ambitions to control the judiciary. As for political
uncertainties, I believe that they will last at least until the local
elections of March 30 and even after that date, I do not think that they will
be easily dispersed.
According to Mr. Babacan, the debts of Turkish firms denominated in hard
currencies are not so dangerous. Indeed, he claims that owners of these firms
have large deposits in foreign currencies enough to help repay their debts.
Yes, but do not confuse the personal fortunes of Turkish capitalists with the
value of their firms. They can easily choose to keep their fortune intact
instead of providing their firms with equity.
The most dramatic of Mr. Babacan's efforts has been the defense of the
Central Bank's independence. He knows very well that Central Bank may be
obliged to react much more aggressively if the depreciation of Turkish lira
persists. The deputy prime minister sent clear warnings to other ministers
who like to recommend what the Central Bank must or must not do, saying, “It
is absolutely wrong to violate the independent sphere of the Central Bank.” I
hope Mr. Babacan will be heard.
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